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A wide range of policy decisions is made on the basis of economic forecasts.Inaccurate or delayed predictions can result in substantial costs for com-
panies and citizens. However, it is an established fact that traditional economic
forecast models lack accuracy (McNees, 1992; Schuh, 2001; Osterloh, 2008). The
recent financial crisis exemplified the failure of economic forecasting. Weeks
after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection, the consensus still pre-
dicted a 2 % rise in German GDP for 2009, but it dropped by 4.5 %. Most often
contemporary forecast methods mix expert knowledge and extrapolation using
historical data. They are often unable to capture economic shocks (Clements and
Hendry, 2002). In Germany, forecasts are provided by numerous institutions and
released on a periodical basis. Additionally, these forecasts vary in time horizon
and definition. Thus decision makers may find it difficult to aggregate vari-
ous forecasts and derive a robust appraisal. However, economic uncertainty is
seen as a major challenge for management and policy-making in the 21st cen-
tury (Greenspan, 2004; Nitin and Stewart, 2006). To conclude, there is no central
mechanism to continuously combine individual forecasts. Combining and elic-
iting this information and forecasts would mean to identify experts, to motivate
their participation, and to determine how to aggregate different opinions.
With the growth of the Internet, markets that trade predictions about future
events have emerged as a promising alternative forecasting tool. In these mar-
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kets, participants trade contracts whose payoff depends on the outcome of un-
certain future events. For example, a market contract might reward a dollar if a
particular presidential candidate is elected. An individual who thinks the can-
didate has a 65 % chance of being elected should be willing to pay up to 65 cents
for such a contract. Market participants form expectations about the outcome
of an event. Comparable to financial markets, they buy if they find that prices
underestimate probability of the event in question and they sell a stock if they
find that prices overestimate the probability of an event. Also called prediction
markets, these markets thereby aggregate information in the same way as a stock
market. Market prices represent the participants’ aggregated expectations and
can be interpreted as the market forecast (Gjerstad and Hall, 2005).
Prediction markets have a long track of successful application in a wide area
ranging from political elections (Berg et al., 2008) to sport events (Luckner et al.,
2008) sometimes outperforming established forecast methods (Spann and Skiera,
2004).
As a forecasting method prediction markets offer many advantages. They pro-
vide the incentives for traders to truthfully disclose their information and an al-
gorithm to weight opinions (Arrow et al., 2008). Compared with statistical fore-
casting methods, these markets can incorporate real-time information. As pre-
diction market prices are updated immediately when traders incorporate their
expectation in prices, they provide continuously and timely updated forecasts.
Compared with eliciting expert opinions, prediction markets eliminate the effort
of identifying experts and motivate their participation. In most cases they allow
anonymous participation, which may increase the likelihood of nonconformists
to participate and reveal information and they do not need to deal with conflict-
ing opinions.
Prediction markets communicate feedback on two levels. Market prices provide
the first feedback. Traders recognize prices as the current aggregated forecast
and incorporate this information in their own beliefs. Secondly, after contracts
are paid out, participants realize their gains and losses. This provides traders
with feedback about their own trading performance. Moreover, as good traders
increase their portfolio value over time, they gain more weight over market run-
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time. To sum up, evidence so far suggests that prediction markets provide con-
siderable advantages in terms of continuous forecasting, participation and infor-
mation revelation.
We thus setup a prediction market called Economic Indicator Exchange (EIX)1
to forecast macroeconomic variables. The EIX play-money prediction market
is specifically designed to continuously and repeatedly forecast economic in-
dicators such as GDP, inflation, Ifo index, investments, export and unemploy-
ment figures in Germany. The goal is to forecast these indicators over long time
horizons and continuously aggregate economic information. In order to build
a sustainable market with long-term participation, the EIX was launched in co-
operation with the leading German economic newspaper “Handelsblatt”. The
cooperation aims at reaching a wide and well-informed audience interested in
financial markets and economic development. The market is publicly available
over the Internet and readers are invited to join.
The advantages of this research setting are at least threefold. To begin with,
market forecasts can be benchmarked against well-established forecasting meth-
ods. Secondly, from an individual perspective, market participants interact in
a repeated decision-making environment closely reassembling decision-making
in financial markets. As the outcome of events in prediction markets is finally
known, we can ex-post measure the participants’ trading performance. Finally,
with over 1,300 participants the EIX-market offers a good platform to run web-
based experiments.
1.2 Research Outline & Questions
This thesis aims to analyze the predictive power of a prediction market for
macroeconomic forecasts. Within the scope of this work, we2 address the fol-
lowing research questions:
1www.eix-market.de or eix.handelsblatt.com
2The We refers to both; the readers of this work and my co-authors. I would like to particularly
thank Christof Weinhardt, Ryan Riordan, Stefan Stathel, Athanasios Mazarakis, Tobias Kranz,
Maximilian Coblenz, Christoph Schiller, Stefan Rehm.
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RQ1. How to quantify prediction market performance and quality? Over the
last couple of years, interest in prediction markets as a forecasting tool has con-
tinuously increased in the scientific world and in industry. Even though there
are numerous empirical prediction market studies, no statistical or quantitative
meta-analysis were conducted to analyze prediction market accuracy for differ-
ent problem types or application areas. One reason is that there is no unified,
stringent methodology used to analyze prediction market data. Moreover, there
is no general understanding what defines prediction market performance. In
finance the ambiguous term of market quality mostly refers to liquidity mea-
sures (e.g. spreads) or information measures such as permanent price impact.
Prediction markets are often quantified solely through the correlation between
predictions (derived from prices) and event outcomes. However, judging pre-
diction market quality on the basis of forecast errors hinders the understanding
of the underlying factors. Therefore there is a need to summarize and evaluate
market performance measures for prediction markets.
RQ2. How to design a market to forecast macroeconomic indices? Macroeco-
nomic forecasts are used extensively in industry and government even though
the historical accuracy and reliability is disputed. In Germany forecasts are
provided by numerous governmental or industry sponsored institutions and
released on periodical basis. Thus, business and governmental decision makers
might find it difficult to aggregate the various forecasts and form a confident
belief. As prediction markets have a track of successful application (e.g., Berg
et al., 2008; Luckner et al., 2008), it seems promising to design a prediction
market to forecast economic indices. However, there is a lack of understanding
how to design and run a prediction market for macroeconomic forecasting.
RQ3. What is the effect of short-selling on market quality and forecast perfor-
mance? Shortly after the beginning of the global financial crisis, several stock
exchange regulators banned short selling on financial markets (SEC, 2008). They
argued that this was necessary to maintain properly operating markets for se-
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curities trading and to ensure the stability of the financial system. An ongoing
debate in finance is whether short selling has positive or negative effects on mar-
ket quality. Introducing short selling in a prediction market setting facilitates the
analysis of its impact on market quality and forecast performance.
RQ4. How do incentives and feedback mechanisms affect participation in pre-
diction markets? An arising question is how to design incentive schemes and
feedback mechanisms to motivate participants in online communities to con-
tribute. Subsequently this leads to the question of how participants can be moti-
vated to contribute and share their information for longer time horizons. In pub-
lic goods projects participation feedback has been found to increase participants’
contributions (Cheshire, 2007). In order to motivate participants intrinsically, we
employ these feedback mechanisms in a prediction market setting and try to find
out (i) which of the feedback types works best at motivating contributions and
(ii) do the additional contributions improve the forecasts?
RQ5. How do trading interfaces affect trading behavior and performance?
Market interfaces tend to be complex and non intuitive. Users not familiar with
such interfaces find it hard to interact. Recently, researchers have identified the
need to merge interface and market design to address this issue (e.g. Seuken
et al., 2010). The goal is to hide the market or to design the interface in a more
intuitive way and thus simplify the market interface. One way to accomplish
that is to simplify the market interface but maintain economic efficiency. Hence,
there is a need to understand which information elements support and which
elements hinder the individual trading process. Moreover, as individuals have
different informational needs and vary in experience, it seems fruitful to develop
customized market interfaces.
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is organized following the order of the before mentioned research
questions. Chapter 2 reviews related work in market engineering and predic-
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tion markets. It additionally provides a prediction market quality framework by
summarizing financial market quality measures and measures for forecast per-
formance. Chapter 3 details the Economic Indicator eXchange (EIX), a prediction
market for macroeconomic forecasts. It discusses market and interface design
choices as well as the course of the two-year field experiment. Chapter 4 de-
scribes the market by applying the before mentioned market quality framework.
We evaluate the market from both a market engineering as well as a forecast-
ing performance perspective.3 Chapter 5 analyzes the effect of introducing short
selling on market quality.4 The subsequent chapter discusses the effect of feed-
back and incentives on learning in markets.5 Addressing the intersectional topic
between market and interface design, Chapter 7 highlights the importance of
consciously designing market interfaces. Firstly, the chapter examines the effect
of different interface elements on trader behavior and performance. Secondly, it
compares trader performance between a simplified and a standard market inter-
face.6 Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the key contributions of the work at hand
and outlines promising topics for future research.
3Parts of this chapter are joint work with Stephan Stathel and Christof Weinhardt and have been
presented at the Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences 2011 (Teschner et al.,
2011) and the Americas Conference on Information Systems 2012 (Teschner and Weinhardt,
2012a)
4The results of this section are published in the Journal of Prediction Markets (joint work with
Maximilian Coblenz and Christof Weinhardt (Teschner et al., 2011))
5The findings have been presented at the International Conference on Information Systems
2011 (joint work with Athanasios Mazarakis, Ryan Riordan and Christof Weinhardt (Teschner
et al., 2011)) and the European Conference on Information Systems 2012 (Teschner and Wein-
hardt, 2012b).
6Selected parts of this chapter have been presented at the Second Conference on Auctions,
Market Mechanisms and Their Applications (Teschner and Weinhardt, 2011) and the Doctoral
Consortium 2011, Wirtschaftsinformatik (Teschner, 2011)
Chapter 2
Related Work & a Prediction Market
Framework
IN 2005 James Surowiecki coined the term the wisdom of crowds by describinghow groups of people solve, under certain conditions, complex problems far
better than single individuals (Surowiecki, 2004). There are various ways to uti-
lize the wisdom of crowds such as using wikis, reputation systems, or polling
mechanisms. Another way to aggregate dispersed information is by setting up
a so called prediction market 1. Over the last couple of years, interest in predic-
tion markets as a forecasting method has continuously increased in the scientific
world and in industry (Tziralis and Tatsiopoulos, 2007). In general, markets ful-
fill at least two roles: allocate resources and aggregate information about the
value of resources (Hayek, 1945). These two roles are best illustrated by a short
example. 90% of all US oranges used in frozen concentrated orange juice are
grown in central Florida. Clearly this makes the weather in central Florida of
critical importance to the future supply of orange juice. Hence traders of orange-
concentrate futures have a good incentive to sell if they belief the weather to be
good for the orange harvest, and vice versa. The market price for these futures
is the aggregate belief off all individual forecasts. Roll (1984) shows that orange-
concentrate prices indicate weather extremes more precisely than the US national
weather service. Thereby markets provide incentives for information revelation
1In literature various names are used such as idea futures, information market, virtual stock
market, artificial and prediction market with the term prediction market the most prevailing.
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and acts as a mechanism for aggregating information.
This work is focused on the informational perspective of markets. Moreover, it is
concerned with the question of how to design and engineer markets to improve
their ability to efficiently aggregate information.
2.1 Market Engineering
An important question in this context is how to design and engineer (electronic)
markets so that they become successful and can actually deliver the transparency
and market efficiency they promise. Following (Weinhardt and Gimpel, 2006, p.
6) we define a market as “a set of humanly devised rules that structure the interaction
and exchange of information by self-interested participants in order to carry out ex-
change transactions at a relatively low cost.” In order to consciously design markets
delivering the desired outcome, Weinhardt et al. (2003); Neumann (2004); Wein-
hardt et al. (2006) propose the Market Engineering Framework (See Figure 2.1, left
side). The goal is to define a structured, systematic, and theoretically founded
procedure of designing, implementing, evaluating, and introducing electronic
market platforms.
The objective of a market engineer is to achieve a desired market outcome or per-
formance. To do so, she can design the transaction object as well as the market
structure. The market structure comprises the market microstructure, the (IT-)
infrastructure, and the business structure. These designed elements, the trans-
action object and the market structure, have only indirect effect on the market
outcome. The link from the structure to the outcome lies in the behavior of mar-
ket participants. Usually, market engineers employ a variety of methodologies
to asses the impact of specific market structures on the participants’ behavior
and thus the outcome. These methods include theoretical modeling (game the-
ory, auction theory, mechanism design) and empirical research such as lab and
field experiments. Until recently there was no common understanding how to
empirically analyze markets and measure their quality. For financial markets
Zhang et al. (2011) present a methodology framework to fill this gap.
To begin with, the socio-economic and legal environment comprises elements
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Figure 2.1: Market Engineering Framework (left) and Process (right) (Weinhardt et al.,
2006)
which cannot directly be influenced. Examples for these elements are the par-
ticipants’ cultural background and norms, their preferences, and the applicable
laws. One part that directly influences and mediates user behavior and which
is outside the framework’s scope is the market’s graphical user interface (GUI).
Just recently Seuken et al. (2011) have highlighted its importance for the success
of markets.
Another part of the overall approach is a structured market engineering pro-
cess (Weinhardt et al., 2007), which defines a best practice process to develop
and implement markets (See Figure 2.1, right side). The process incorporates
five stages; In the environmental analysis the requirements of the new electronic
market are deduced. The second stage of the process comprises the design of the
market with the simultaneous consideration of the market structure. Having de-
signed the market, it is tested upon its technical and economic properties. This is
followed by the implementation stage in which the design is realized and imple-
mented as a software system. Finally, the introduction of the electronic market
initiates its operation cycle (Neumann, 2004).
In order to keep up with recent developments in software engineering (rapid,
test-driven development), (Block, 2010, p. 99) adapts the process to an agile
market engineering process. “In its core, the agile market engineering process model
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builds on short, incremental market development cycles and frequent user feedback in
order to develop and to continuously refine and improve the electronic market platform.”
Thus far it remains unclear how rapid continuous market improvements can be
aligned with a rigorous scientific method.
As presented a wide range of design considerations have to be taken into account
to develop a market. Each market has different objectives and requirements and
hence needs to be carefully engineered. In the next section, markets designed
to aggregate dispersed information for forecasting purposes, so called Prediction
Markets, are introduced. Thereafter, design parameters for prediction markets
will be discussed.
2.2 Prediction Markets
Prediction markets have proven to successfully forecast events in a wide range of
applications. They facilitate and support decision making through aggregating
expectations about events (Hahn and Tetlock, 2006). The roots of their predictive
power are twofold: the market provides the incentives for traders to truthfully
disclose their information and an algorithm to weight opinions (Arrow et al.,
2008).
The most basic trading mechanism for prediction markets is based on a continu-
ous double auction for one stock which represents the outcome of an event. The
stock will pay a predefined value (e.g. 100) if an event has the predicted outcome
and else the stock will be worthless. Market participants hold beliefs about the
likelihood of an event. Comparable to financial markets, they buy if they find
that prices underestimate the event in question and they sell a stock if they find
that prices overestimate the probability of an event. A famous example is the
Iowa political stock market (PSM) which predicts the outcome of U.S. presiden-
tial elections. The Iowa PSM features contracts that represent one nominee each.
Market participants buy and sell nominee contracts depending on their assess-
ment of the U.S. presidential election outcome. The U.S. presidential elections
are well suited for a prediction market. In the final pre-election period only two
candidates have a chance of winning the election which gives the market two
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complementary assets. Also, only one of the nominees will win and the other
one will lose. The first stock pays 100 if the second is judged at 0 and vice versa.
Which means a stock pays 100 if the corresponding nominee wins an election.
Usually this market design offers the possibility to buy and sell bundles of both
stocks for 100 which implies that in a frictionless world with rational traders
both stock prices always sum up to 100 (Berg et al., 2000).
The above described form of representing a single event with two complemen-
tary stocks has been the default since its proposal. In fact the concept has been
so successful that it was adapted for events with more than two outcomes. For
example, Luckner and Weinhardt (2008) design a market to predict the outcome
of the FIFA soccer world cup 2006 where the value of all 32 stocks combined is
predefined. All traded stock prices are dependent as there is by definition only
one world champion.
2.2.1 Prediction Market Framework
Even though there are numerous empirical prediction market studies; no meta-
analysis has been conducted that analyzed prediction market accuracy for vari-
ous types of problems and fields of application. One reason for that is that there
is no unified, stringent methodology used to analyze prediction market data.
Although there are a some published guidelines (Luckner, 2008; Sripawatakul
and Sutivong, 2010; Plott and Chen, 2002) on how to design and implement a
prediction market, no work has yet been done on an evaluation methodology.
Moreover, there is no general understanding what defines prediction market
quality.Hence, we present an array of market quality measures which can en-
rich the prediction market methodology.
Due to a missing precise definition of market quality, we provide a methodol-
ogy framework that puts several prominent measures of market quality into the
context of internal design factors. Its structure and the outline of the following
section is inspired by Zhang et al. (2011). The proposed framework for prediction
market quality (Figure 2.2) consists of three main parts which will be discussed
separately in the following subsections:
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1. The forecasting goal.
2. The internal market design fundamentals such as the market microstruc-
ture, the incentives and the technology.
3. And quantifiable measures of market quality in terms of activity, liquidity,
information and forecast performance.
The forecasting goal and description of the prediction issue influence market
quality indirectly. In contrast, the internal market design concerns how the mar-
ket is designed, incentivized, and implemented. Finally in order to implement
and run the market, the operators can use a wide variety of IS-technologies. The
technology used affects the trading system performance as well asthe intuitive-
ness of the user interface.
Figure 2.2: Prediction market quality framework, following Zhang et al. (2011)
Forecasting Goal
We see the forecasting goal as externally given, for example the prediction of
product sales in the next month. Thus it is not under the explicit influence of
the market designer. This means that an event is unambiguously the basis for
the cash dividend of the respective shares of stock. However, the determination
of the cash dividend needs to be clearly communicated to the market partici-
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pants. Additionally, the participants need to have some knowledge about the
event outcome, otherwise stock prices are randomly set (Forsythe et al., 1992).
The most common prediction deals with the occurrence or non-occurrence of a
particular event. This is often represented as a binary outcome. This is within
the design considerations of the market designer. A specific outcome can usu-
ally be represented in various ways. The Iowa presidential market is a prime
example. The outcome is the president to be elected. One design could feature
the vote-share a nominee achieves. Another could be whether one nominee wins
the election. Essentially the information gathered is very similar. However the
vote-share design is a linear representation of a binary outcome (Berg and Rietz,
2006). Other possible prediction issues corresponding to specified events could
be the prediction of an absolute number, such as the unemployment number in
a certain month or the prediction of a relative number, for example the market
share in a particular period. The appropriate formulation for the payoff function
in both cases could be a linear transformation. Empirical results from political
stock markets indicate that prediction markets work for different payoff func-
tions as long as they are comprehensible for participants (Forsythe et al., 1999).
Market Design
The key design elements comprise the contract specification, the choice and de-
tails of the trading mechanism, the incentives provided, and the trading technol-
ogy.
The central aspect of any trading platform is how buyers and sellers are matched.
The most popular method is the continuous double auction (CDA). In a CDA, in-
formation is continuously updated as traders use news and events to revise their
decisions and make a profit by acting accordingly. In this structure, traders place
buy (bid) or sell (ask) orders for a contract with a specific volume, time validity
and price. When the prices match or the ask price is lower than the bid price,
a trade occurs. This continues until all matching orders have been fulfilled and
a gap (spread) exists between the bid and ask prices. As the mechanism only
matches willing traders, it can be implemented as a zero-sum game meaning
that the market operator cannot lose money. As a consequence this mechanism
14 Related Work & a Prediction Market Framework
is especially useful for real-money exchanges. Alternative mechanisms are call
auctions, (dynamic) pari-mutual markets (Pennock, 2004) and market scoring
rules (Hanson, 2003). A discussion of the mechanisms’ differences can be found
in (Christiansen, 2007; Luckner, 2008).
Three common contract types are winner-takes-all, index and conditional con-
tracts. In the winner-takes-all or digital markets only one contract is paid out
whereas all others are valued zero in the end.Usually the market offers a portfo-
lio trade where one share of each contract can be bought for 100. Traders have the
opportunity to gain money by exploring arbitrage opportunities in two ways.
First by buying a portfolio and selling the contracts separately. If the sum of the
single contracts exceeds 100, participants can buy all contracts for 100 and sell
them individually. Second if the sum of all contracts’ prices is below 100, traders
can profit by buying individual contracts and selling the portfolio bundle for
100. In index markets, shares in the market are paid out according to a cer-
tain percentage. Referring to the presidential markets if the market’s question
is “What vote share will a candidate achieve?” The contract is worth the final
vote share. Again, portfolio trading makes sense as the sum of all vote shares is
100. Conditional contracts were proposed by Hanson (2003) to create more com-
plex decision markets. Contracts are paid out either in a binary or index way if
a certain preliminary condition is fulfilled (Hanson, 2006). The proposition was
made in order to value a nominee under the assumption dependent on who will
be the nominees’ opponent.
As pointed out by Servan-Schreiber et al. (2004) there are two essential factors
driving the prediction market accuracy; knowledge and motivation. One prac-
tical way to increase motivation is the promise of winning money. As a conse-
quence the first prediction markets as the Iowa electronic markets (IEM) were set
up as real money markets. In order to register participants have to deposit real
money. One drawback of real money markets is legal regulations. Real contract
exchanges are subject to governmental monitoring and require licenses in most
countries. These markets can also be seen as gambling which is prohibited as
soon as real money is involved. Gruca et al. (2008) point out that it is an ongo-
ing debate whether real and play money markets behave identical. According
Related Work & a Prediction Market Framework 15
to Servan-Schreiber et al. (2004) and Rosenbloom and Notz (2006) play money
markets are as accurate as real money markets. They argue that real money mar-
kets may better motivate information discovery while play money markets may
yield more efficient information aggregation. Luckner et al. (2008) find that play
money markets for the FIFA world cup are about as accurate as betting mar-
kets, which are strongly incentivized. Gruca et al. (2008) argue that there is no
difference in forecast accuracy as long as there is a lot of publicly available in-
formation; otherwise real-money markets perform better. In order to set some
incentives in play money markets the usual procedure is to shuffle prizes among
participants. There are various winning schemes possible. Luckner and Wein-
hardt (2007) find rank-order winning schemes lead to the best results in terms of
prediction accuracy due to the risk aversion of traders in competitive environ-
ments. In contrast to that, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006a) state that rank-order
tournaments potentially provide an incentive to add variance to one’s true be-
liefs. As fixed payments do not stop traders to be irrationally active in their
experiment Luckner et al. (2008) conclude that traders are not only driven by
monetary incentives. Spann and Skiera (2003) point out that the motivation to
participate decreases if payout dates are too far in future. If the disbursement
is limited, the question arises how to motivate traders intrinsically. Christiansen
(2007) describes an accurate prediction market forecasting rowing events in the
UK with no monetary or prize incentives at all. Furthermore, he speculates that
reputation within the rowing community and passion about the game itself gen-
erates enough motivation. Cowgill et al. (2009) find when adding “fun markets”2
to serious business related markets that volume in both markets are positively
correlated, suggesting that the former might increase participation.
The last design factor, technology, comprises the trading system from an inter-
nal market technology perspective and the trading interface. The technology ad-
vancements in computer technology and networks have profoundly influenced
financial markets and enabled new applications like algorithmic trading. This
forced nearly all exchange operators to improve and upgrade their trading sys-
2The term “fun” markets refers to market questions whose sole purpose is to entertain partici-
pants. They are therefore not directly business related.
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tems. Hence, this development has been studied repeatedly. For example the
Wagener et al. (2010) focus on the effect of an infrastructure upgrade (which re-
duced system latency) in the Xetra stock market. They study price efficiency,
measured as the pricing gaps between the observed futures prices and their the-
oretical values based on the underlying cash market. Their results suggest that
the system upgrade reduced the pricing gap and improved price efficiency. In
the domain of experimental markets, Kolitz (2008) studies the effect of the two
different systems using the same auction mechanism on welfare. He finds that
the faster system (meet2trade market platform) which allows to process a higher
number of bids leads to higher overall welfare.
The second technology aspect is the market interface. As pointed out by Seuken
et al. (2011) there is very limited empirical work on decision processes in trad-
ing environments with focus on the trading interface. Kauffman and Diamond
(1990) highlight the importance of research on behavioral decision making and
information presentation effects. They examine how behavioral effects may be-
come operative in screen-based securities and foreign exchange trading activ-
ities, where users can choose among information presentation formats which
support trader decision making. They present a model to identify where and
how information, heuristics and biases might effect decision making in the trad-
ing environment.
2.2.2 Market Quality Measures
In the following subsection we detail the tools to systematically analyze pre-
diction markets. To our knowledge there is no stringent methodology to ana-
lyze prediction markets. Prediction markets are often quantified solely through
the correlation between predictions (derived from prices) and event outcomes.
However judging prediction market quality on the basis of forecast precision
hinders the understanding of the key success factors. As it is rather untypical
to report market measures in the prediction market community; we rely on fi-
nancial market literature. Due to a missing precise definition of market quality,
we provide a list of market quality proxies through which markets can be com-
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pared on a more granular level. Following our framework (Figure 2.2) we start
by describing activity and liquidity measures. We continue by describing three
information measures and close with a short review of the most prominent fore-
cast error measures.
Activity
Activity can be measured using daily measures like the number of trades (trade
count), the trading volume (turnover), or the average trade size (see Hendershott
et al. (2010) and Zhang et al. (2011)). Trading intensity measures are usually
calculated on a daily basis per stock. The first three measures are closely related.
An increase in the number of trades does not unconditionally imply an increase
in trading volume, since trade sizes also have to be taken into account. While
all three measures can be classified as trading intensity, quote updates can be
considered as a measure for the mere market activity of traders. The market
size is defined by the number of active traders during market activity period.
This may range from 15 (in corporate settings) to more than 50 traders which is
common in public markets (Plott and Chen, 2002; Christiansen, 2007).
Liquidity Measures
Liquidity represents the transaction cost market participants face to trade. A
measure for the liquidity is an asset’s ability to be sold rapidly, with minimal
loss of value, at any time within market hours (Harris, 2002). We calculate half-
spreads rather than round-trip (full) spreads. Quoted spreads are the simplest
and most common measure of trading costs and can easily be calculated using
trade and orderbook data. All calculations presented below are spreads relative
to stock price and are reported in basis points (bps). Let Aski,t be the ask price
for a stock i at time t and Bidi,t the respective bid price. Midi,t denotes the mid
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Additionally, we separate in quoted spread and quoted spread at trade. The first
measure includes all orderbook changes whereas the second is limited to quotes
just before a trade is executed.
The effective spread is the spread paid when an incoming market orders trades
against a limit order. Let Pricei,t be the execution price then the effective spread
is defined as:




Di,t denotes the trade direction, −1 for a sell and +1 for a buy order. The real-
ized spread measures liquidity supplier revenues (Bessembinder and Kaufman,
1997). The Glosten-Milgrom model also highlights that spreads widen if the risk
of trading against asymmetrically informed traders is high in order to compen-
sate for losses to the informed traders (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). The realized
spread is calculated with the mid-quote (x) minutes after the trade as follows:





As in many datasets (e.g. Intrade) the orderbook data is not available for an ex-
post analysis, one might estimate the spread. Finance literature suggest several
spread estimators. One of the most recent estimate methods was proposed by
Corwin and Schultz (2011) (CSS). They derive an estimator for the bid-ask spread
based on readily available data of daily high and low prices. The estimator is
based on two ideas. Daily high prices (Ht) are almost always buy orders and
daily low prices (Lt) are most likely sell orders. The price ratio of high-to-low
price is due to volatility which increases proportionately with the length of the
trading intervals. Hence they propose to derive an estimate of a stock’s bid-ask
spread as a function of the high-to-low price ratio for a single two-day period
and the high-to-low ratio for two consecutive days (Ht,t+1, Lt,t+1). They define










































The estimator is easy to calculate and can be applied in prediction market con-
texts in which only transaction prices are available.
Another proxy for spreads is Amihud’s illiquidity (ILLIQ) measure (Amihud,
2002). The measure uses the daily ratio of absolute stock returns in relation to
the trading volume in any given period for a specific instrument (i). Where |Rit|
is the daily stock’s absolute return and Volit is the trading volume during that










Both input variables volume and returns are easily calculated from published
prediction market data.
Information Measures
In most prediction markets we can observe the outcome, i.e. the fundamental
value of each stock. Therefore, we can ex-post measure the information content
of each order. If an order moved the price in the right direction with respect to
the final outcome of the stock, it is informed; whereas an order moving the price
in opposite direction to the final outcome, it is uninformed. Thus, we present the
following score to capture this process:
Scoreoi =

1 i f priceo,i ≤ f vi & otype = BUY
1 i f priceo,i ≥ f vi & otype = SELL
0 i f priceo,i > f vi & otype = BUY
0 i f priceo,i < f vi & otype = SELL
(2.8)
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The price of an order o for the stock i is represented as priceo,i. The fundamental
final outcome value of a stock is represented by f vi. In other words the Scoreoi
rates an order as profitable or not.
In finance literature the price impact is used as an approximate measure of the
adverse selection component of the effective spread. The price impact is the ef-
fective spread minus the realized spread and measures the information content
of a trade. It approximates the permanent impact of a trade under the assump-
tion that information impacts are permanent and realized at the x-minute mark.
Following a trade, liquidity suppliers adjust their beliefs about the fundamental
value of an asset depending on the information content of a trade (Glosten and
Milgrom, 1985). The simple price impact of a trade is calculated as follows:




The price impact provides an indication of the information content of a trade.
Again in cases where the full dataset is unavailable, finance literature suggests
a promising approximation to quantify the information flow. The probability
of informed trading (PIN) represents the implicit risk that a market participant
faces when trading with a better informed participant on the direction of the
underlying event. Following Easley et al. (2002) we calculate PIN as follows:
PIN =
αµ
αµ + εs + εb
(2.10)
In the Easley et al. (2002) model αµ + εs + εb gives the arrival rate for all orders
and αµ is the arrival rate for information based orders. With the fraction of in-
formed traders denoted by µ, and the likelihood of information events described
by α. The model interprets the normal level of buys and sells per day in a stock
as uninformed trade and it uses this data to identify (εs, εb). The days with ab-
normal levels of buys and sells are interpreted as information-based trading and
used to identify α and δ. In order to estimate the model, one only needs the
number of buyer- and seller-initiated trades.
One expects the buy and sell trades to be equally likely to be informed (εs = εb =
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ε) and news are equally likely to be good or bad δ = 0.5. Let α denote the prob-
ability that an information event occurs. Informed agents only trade when an
information event has occurred. If the information is bad news (δ) uninformed
traders buy, if it is good news (1− δ) they sell. The arrival rate of orders is rep-
resented by µ which is assumed to be identical for informed buy and sell orders.
With the maximum likelihood method one can estimate the probability that an
information event occurs on a given day (α), the probability that an information
event is negative (δ) and the order arrival rates of informed and uninformed
traders (µ and ε).
Forecast Performance
In binary markets transaction prices typically provide useful (albeit sometimes
biased) estimates of average beliefs about the probability of an event (Manski,
2006; Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2006a). The simplest form of forecast performance
evaluation is to calculate the difference between the mean of beliefs and the out-
come. However, it is not a one-dimensional concept to judge the forecast quality
of probability forecasts. In general, there are three criteria to take into considera-
tion: accuracy, reliability (calibration), and discrimination (resolution). Accuracy
is a measure of the average distance between forecast and outcome. According
to Lichtenstein et al. (1982), Reliability or Calibration refers to the degree of cor-
respondence between forecast probabilities and actual (observed) relative event
frequencies. Whereas Discrimination or Resolution taps a forecasters’ ability to
perform better than a simple predict-the-base-rate strategy. Forecasts get perfect
discrimination scores when they assign the probability of one to outcomes that
happen and probability of zero to outcomes that do not (Tetlock, 2005). Discrim-
ination and Calibration are best explained in a short example. Let’s assume the
forecasting goal is to predict the chance of rain at a given time. Let’s further as-
sume that on one out of ten days it is raining. A forecast has a high resolution if
the prediction points at the day it’s going to rain. Calibration refers to the overall
probability of rain (e.g. 10 %). Thus, a forecaster is well calibrated by assigning
a 10% probability of rain to each individual day.
When comparing outcome probability with different underlying variability (e.g.
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different domains) one has to take the different uncertainties into account. Nagar
and Malone (2011) propose to use the Sharpe ratio to compare reward relative to
risk performance. We adopt the Sharpe (1994, 1966)-ratio the following way: in
a binary outcome market, let the market return be defined as RM = 1−MAEM.
With MAE defined as the mean absolute error (see Table 2.1). Note that, in line
with the Sharpe-ratio, the higher the positive return the better a forecast. As a
benchmark return we use a naive prediction, who bets always 50%. The cor-
responding benchmark return is therefore RB = 0.5. Furthermore the abnormal
return is then defined as the difference between benchmark and market return.
Finally, we relate the average abnormal return to the standard deviation of the
abnormal returns ( s = dσd ).
In binary outcome markets it seems intuitive to present accuracy as a hit-rate.
If an an outcome has an assigned probability of 50% or more and the outcome
comes true, it is counted as a hit otherwise as a false. The hit-rate is than calcu-
lated as the percentage of hits. In prediction settings where the economic value
of prediction is unclear, and hence it is impossible to derive a error scoring rule it
is common to apply the Receiver-Operating-Characteristic (ROC) (Swets, 1988;
Zweig and Campbell, 1993). ROC balances the hit rate versus false alarm rate
(1-hit rate). This is done by plotting the hit rate versus the false alarm rate over
a range of different thresholds that are used to convert probabilistic forecasts of
binary events into deterministic binary forecasts. The area under the curve indi-
cated the quality of the predictions, with a perfect predictor scoring of one.
In linear outcome markets, prices do not reflect the probability of an outcome
but the market participant’s aggregated belief about the fundamental value of
the underlying event. Thus, the interpretation of the price is directly linked to
the outcome value. There are various ways to generate forecasts from market
prices. For example participants can either infer that the midi,t or the last trad-
ing price are the forecast for stock i at time t. In the following sections a market
f orecastt refers to the average transaction price on day t.
A first indication about the market outcome is given by the deviation between
market prices and fundamental values. In the following the difference between
the fundamental value of the stock i ( f vi) and the market f orecastt,i represents
Related Work & a Prediction Market Framework 23
Measure Definition
Mean Absolute Error (MAEt)
∑ni=1 errori,t
n





Percent Mean Absolute Deviation (PMADt)
∑ni=1 errori,t
f vi










Table 2.1: Error Measures
the errort,i. Studying the error terms we can analyze the forecast properties. to
begin with a forecast is unbiased if it has zero mean. Secondly, the forecast is
efficient if the error is uncorrelated to the variables (information) used in con-
structing the forecast. This means the forecast error is unpredictable. Finally,
we have to compare forecast errors of different forecast approaches. The com-
parison of forecast approaches depend on a user’s cost function (sometimes also
referred to as scoring rules) (Clements and Hendry, 2002). In principle, costs
can be attached to a forecast bias and error variance. These costs will depend
on the purposes of the forecast. Thus, cost functions define how forecast prop-
erties should be weighted when comparing different forecasts. For example, if
(squared) bias and variance are combined one-for-one, we obtain the forecast’s
mean square error (MSE). Table 2.1 presents some commonly-reported forecast
error measures. A detailed discussion of the presented measures can be found
in (Fildes and Stekler, 2002).
A problem with the error functions defined in Table 2.1 is their comparabil-
ity. If applied to series with different units or different baselines, comparing the
error terms leads to misguided results. Hence, one needs to measure the rela-
tive accuracy. One idea is to normalize the forecast error by a naive benchmark
forecast. This measure is called Theil’s U statistic (Leitch and Tanner, 1991). It is






The forecast in question is thereby compared with a naive forecast derived by
mere chance (e.g. random walk or a simple AR(1)-Model).
If the value of U is less than 1 the forecast is relatively good. If U equals one, the
forecast is just as good as the naive forecast. U-values greater than one indicate
that the forecast is of little use. Theil’s U is specifically suitable for the mea-
surement of the forecast quality since it does not only make the forecast quality
assessable between the respective forecasts, but represents an ultimate measure
for forecast capability as well.
In order to test for weak form forecast efficiency in which forecasts contain all
available information at the time the forecast is generated, we adapt a test by
Nordhaus (1985). Weak-form forecast efficiency means that all forecast revisions
and errors should be uncorrelated with past forecast revisions. Expressed dif-
ferently revisions and errors should follow a random walk. In the following a
revision is defined as:
revisioni,t = f orecasti,t−1 − f orecasti,t (2.12)
To test for correlation we use the following OLS regression:
revi,t = α ∗ revi,t−1 + β ∗ revi,t−2 + γ ∗ revi,t−3 (2.13)
Note that forecast efficiency differs from market efficiency by Fama (1970, 1991)
in the sense that it does not test for correlation on a trade by trade basis but on
an aggregated daily level.
In order to quantify the information contained in comparable forecasts we pro-
pose to use the Fair-Shiller Model (Fair and Shiller, 1989). The information con-
tained in one forecast compared to another forecast, from a different source, can
be assessed using a regression of actual values on predicted values generated
from the forecasts. Let f orecastt,com denote a comparable, in terms of unit and
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time horizon, forecast to the market f orecastt,market, then the estimates in the fol-
lowing regression represent the information contained in each forecast.
actual outcome = α ∗ f orecastt,com + β ∗ f orecastt,market (2.14)
If both forecasts are just noise, a,b are zero. If both forecasts contain information
but the information in one forecast is completely contained in the other forecast,
hence one forecast does not contribute additional information, then one but not
both estimates should be nonzero. Fair and Shiller (1990) show that the regres-
sion is useful in comparing different forecast models.
Combining Forecasts
Combining forecasts can reduce error in several ways. A combined forecast is
likely to be more accurate than a typical forecast of an individual component,
because biases associated with the data and methods used in various forecasts
are likely to differ. Bates and Granger (1969) find that combining two forecasts
reduces the error by 11% on average. In line with this early finding in a meta-
analysis of 30 studies, Armstrong (2008) finds that combined forecasts have a
12% lower error than the average forecast component. However, literature also
points out why combined forecasts are often not applied. For example, Larrick
and Soll (2006) show that people often hold incorrect beliefs about averaging,
falsely concluding that the average of two forecasts would be no more accu-
rate than the average of both forecasts. Previous findings suggest that forecasts
should be weighted equally, unless there is strong prior evidence that supports
differential weights. Hogarth (2006) points out that it is difficult to accept the
idea that simple models can predict complex phenomena better than complex
ones.
2.2.3 Markets for Economic Outcomes
Markets for macroeconomic variables have been used since the 80s. The Cof-
fee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange established a futures market for the Consumer
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Price Index allowing traders to hedge on inflation. The market was closed due
to low interest (Mbemap, 2004). In 1993 Robert Shiller argued for the creation
of ’Macro Markets’ which would allow a more effective risk allocation (Shiller,
1993). In 2002 Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank set up the so called “Economic
Derivatives” market tied to macroeconomic outcomes such as ISM Manufactur-
ing, change in Non-Farm Payrolls, Initial Jobless Claims and Consumer Price
Index (Gadanecz et al., 2007). The traded contracts are securities whose payoffs
are based on macroeconomic data releases. The instruments are traded as a se-
ries (between 10-20) of binary options. For example a single data release of the
retail sales in April 2005 was traded as 18 stocks. In order to maximize liquidity
the market operators used a series of occasional dutch auctions just before the
data releases instead of the more common continuous trading on most financial
markets. Thus the market provided hedging opportunities against event risks
and a short horizon market forecast of certain economic variables. By analyzing
the forecast efficiency Gurkaynak and Wolfers (2006) find that market generated
forecasts are very similar but more accurate than survey based forecasts. One
must note, that the Bloomberg survey forecasts are published on Fridays before
the data release, whereas the auction was run, and the forecast was generated,
on the data release day.
In an attempt to forecast inflation changes in Germany, Berlemann and Nelson
(2005) set up a series of markets. The markets feature continuous trading of
binary contracts. In a second field experiment Berlemann et al. (2005) used a
similar system in order to aggregate information about inflation expectations in
Bulgaria. All in all, the reported forecast results in both experiments are mixed
and not too promising. Besides the low number of forecast events both experi-
ments suffer from low public interest resulting in illiquid markets.
A Case for a New Market Design
As detailed in the last section, previous research focuses on binary contracts.
However, the standard approach reaches its limits if the number of outcomes
is very high or even infinite. For instance, in a market to assess GDP growth,
possible outcome ranges from -100% to infinity. A common work-around is to
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set arbitrary intervals over the range of possible outcomes and trade each inter-
val as an individual stock. The market operator faces two decisions in such a
setting. First, she has to pre-estimate a reasonable range of possible outcomes.
Secondly, she has to set corresponding intervals. E.g. if the pre-estimated win-
dow for GDP growth is between 0% and 5% then the market operator still needs
to define the number of intervals. A fixed interval size already limits the accu-
racy of the prediction and the choice of range might bias a prediction market’s
results. In the GDP case mentioned, market participants have the choice of six
answers (six different stocks) in 1% intervals. Even if market participants predict
the right interval, such a prediction market would still yield inaccurate forecasts.
Additionally as it is desirable to forecast not only the next upcoming period but
longer horizons, the number of needed contracts rises. Using binary contracts
with 1 %-intervals, five indicators and three periods per indicator would lead
to a minimum of 60 contracts. The high number of contracts would result in
low liquidity and eventually diminish the forecast accuracy (Brenner et al., 1999;
Abramowicz, 2004).
Analyzing the “Economic Derivatives” market dataset, Sonnemann et al. (2008)
find a bias which they called “partition-dependence”. They show that by arbitrar-
ily setting intervals on the state space the market operator influences the judged
likelihood. Thus, all previous markets suffer from a bias induced by the market
operator.
It is well known that people have difficulties understanding and using proba-
bilities (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). In order to reduce the complex task of
accessing probabilities people rely on a set of heuristics which sometimes lead
to serve and systematic errors. In particular, people underweight outcomes that
are merely probable in comparison to outcomes that are obtained with certainty
(Camerer and Lowenstein, 2003). In (betting) markets this leads to the long-shot
bias. Near certainties are undervalued whereas low probabilities are overvalued
(Berg and Rietz, 2006; Snowberg and Wolfers, 2005). Thus, Wolfers and Zitze-
witz (2006b) advised caution interpreting the prices of low probability events.
It seems clear that the representation of more or less continuous outcomes
through intervals does not produce ideal results. The benefit of representing
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an event with a range of all-encompassing stocks is out-leveraged by the hassle
of trading a large number of stocks. The market design, proposed in this thesis,
tries to circumvent the presented problems by representing events as linearly
paid out contracts.
2.3 Summary
In the previous section presented our research foundations. By describing the
market engineering approach, we identify three open questions. To begin the
market user interface as the first point of contact with market participants has
yet not been considered as influencing participant behavior. This gap will be
addressed in chapter seven. Secondly, the idea of rapidly developing and im-
proving markets (Continuous Market Engineering), seems promising in the fast
changing e-commerce world. However, there has been no work done on apply-
ing and empirically evaluating the method.
Closely related is the topic of market evaluation; until now there is only a lim-
ited amount of literature on measuring market quality. In the second half of the
previous chapter we addressed this issue. By summarizing previous work we
detailed a prediction market framework with a strong focus on how to evaluate
prediction markets. The framework combines and applies both finance and fore-
casting literature. The market performance measures will be applied in chapter
four.
Looking at previous markets for economic indicators, we found promising but
mixed results regarding market accuracy and liquidity. Moreover the previously
employed digital contract structure seems to have drawbacks when used in con-
tinuous outcome settings. This leads to the question if there are different ways
to design efficient markets for economic variables.
Chapter 3
EIX - The Economic Indicator
Exchange
ACCURATE and reliable forecasts of future short- and long-term economicdevelopments are a crucial competitive factor for companies, regions and
countries and an important foundation for political decision making. Hence, it
does not come as a surprise that the prediction of future business cycle devel-
opments is one of the most extensively pondered subjects in economic research.
Over the past decades a broad variety of technical, statistical as well as qualita-
tive methods have been developed to foresee economic trends.
It is well a known that traditional economic forecast models lack the necessary
accuracy (Clements and Hendry, 2002).
As Oller and Barot (2000) point out the quality of forecasts has generally not
improved over the past 40 years despite massive progress in statistical method-
ology and computer technology. In fact quantitative, technical methods have
proven to fail regularly when major changes to the general economic environ-
ment and paradigm shifts appear (Osterloh, 2008; McNees, 1992; Schuh, 2001).
Yet another issue is the reliance of the current forecasts on expert input. Experts
are prone to biases and political influence and generally do not perform better
than novices in forecasting future events (Armstrong, 2008). Due to the reliance
on personal judgments, forecasts have been found to exhibit a bias towards opti-
mism (Batchelor, 2007). In Germany forecasts are produced by numerous institu-
tions and released on periodical basis. Moreover, forecasts vary in time horizon
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and definition. Thus, economic agents (e.g. decision maker) relying on these
forecasts might find it difficult to aggregate the various forecasts and come to a
confident appraisal. To conclude, up till recently there is no central mechanism
to combine individual forecast to from a common informative basis.
3.1 Introduction
In October 2009 a play money prediction market, specifically designed to fore-
cast economic indicators such as GDP, inflation, investments, export and un-
employment figures in Germany, was launched. The market called Economic
Indicator Exchange (EIX)1 was created in cooperation with the leading German
economic newspaper “Handelsblatt”. The cooperation aims at reaching a wide
and well informed audience interested in financial markets and economic de-
velopment. We thus expect no problems understanding the indicators and the
concept of trading. The market is publicly available over the Internet and read-
ers are invited to join. The registration is free and requires besides a valid email
address just minimal personal information.
When starting the project we intended to maintain it for one year. However due
to its success we extended it for another two years. After the first year (named
version one, or round one) we slightly adapted the system for the second year
(version two, or round two). The third year is not covered here.
3.2 Market Design
The market design features a continuous double auction without designated
market maker. Participants are allowed to submit marketable limit orders with
0.01 increments through a web-based interface. After registration participants
are endowed with 1,000 stocks of each contract and 100,000 play money units.
We propose to represent continuous outcomes with one stock and define a linear
payout function. Contracts for each economic indicator are paid out according
1www.eix-market.de or eix.handelsblatt.com
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to equation 3.1.
p = 100 + α× ( It0 − It−1
It−1
) with α = 10 (3.1)
A contract is worth: 100 +/- α times the percentage change for an indicator in
play money (e.g. a change of 2.1 % results in a price of 121). We set α to 10. There-
fore the representable outcome events range from -10 % to infinity. To represent
the whole outcome range from -100%, α could be set to one. Previous work in-
dicates that market participants find it difficult to estimate minor changes in the
underlying (Stathel et al., 2009). Hence, we propose to scale the minor changes
to a certain level. Looking at historical data there were no events where the Ger-
man GDP dropped 10 % per quarter. The rationale for setting α to 10 was the
deliberation that participants find it more intuitive to enter integers in order to
to express reasonable accuracy. Additionally, German statistical data releases
rarely come with more than one decimal.
Table 3.1 summarizes the economic variables tradable on the market. Due to
the payout function and the selection of the corresponding units; all stock prices
are expected to roughly range between 50 and 150. Therefore participants could
similarly gain by investing in specific indicators. To facilitate longer forecast
horizons every indicator is represented by three independent stocks each rep-
resenting the next three data releases (t1, t2, t3). As a consequence the initial
forecast periods vary between one month for monthly released indicators up to
three quarters for quarterly released variables. The day before the release date
the trading in the concerned stock is stopped. Finally, stocks are liquidated ac-
cording to the payout function defined in equation 3.1. As soon as the trading in
one stock stops a new stock of the same indicator (e.g. t4) is introduced into the
market. This means that participants received 1,000 new stocks of the respective
indicator. All in all, participants are able to continuously trade 18 stocks at all
times.
3.2.1 Contracts
The indicators are a mix of leading (forecasting the economy, e.g. Investments)
and lagging (describing the state of the economy, e.g. Unemployment numbers)
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Indicator Unit Data release N Pay-off
cycle function
Exports (V1) rel.− Changest−1 monthly 12 (-) 100 + α× ( It0−It−1It−1 )
Exports (V2) Billion(abs.) monthly - (12) ABS(Number) + 30
GDP rel.− Changest−1 quarterly 4 (4) 100 + α× ( It0−It−1It−1 )
Ifo Index (V1) abs.− Changest−1 monthly 3 (-) 100 + α× (It0 − It−1)
Ifo Index (V2) Points (abs.) monthly - (12) ABS(Points)
Inflation rel.− Changest−12 monthly 11 (12) 100 + α× ( It0−It−12It−12 )
Investments rel.− Changest−1 quarterly 5 (4) 100 + α× ( It0−It−1It−1 )
Unemployment Million (abs.) monthly 12 (12) 100 + ABS(Number)100.000
Table 3.1: Economic variables and their payoff functions. The Ifo Index was introduced
in August 2010. For the second round the Export and Ifo pay-off function were changed.
N denotes the number of payouts in the first and (second) round.
economic indicators.
One should note that contracts are liquidated based on the first data release
(preliminary estimate). However, one mayor problem with macroeconomic data
is its poor quality and its slow availability (Croushore and Stark, 2001). For in-
stance, export data is typically available only after a quarter, and the subsequent
revisions (over the next 2 years or so) can be sizable. There are much less, if
any, revisions in data on unemployment and inflation data. Additionally to the
revision problem, one has to be very careful about the contract specification and
the data adjustments used. We base our payouts on the seasonally-adjusted,
calendar-adjusted data release of the official statistical agency2. For Exports, In-
vestments and GDP the data is also price-adjusted. The exact definitions are
given on the web page. The selection and precise definition follows what the
media usually reports in a more casual way3.
2www.destatis.de, the agency uses the ARIMA.X12 to adjust the data.
3Before the experiment started we had several discussions with media experts from Handels-
blatt and economists from the Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft, Köln to ensure the correct-
ness of the definitions.
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3.2.2 Short Selling
Since we do not have complementary stocks which would allow participants to
artificially create stocks by buying a bundle, a challenge of our design is how
to inject stocks in the market in the first place. We employ two potential ap-
proaches. To begin with, we endow all traders with an initial stock portfolio.
Secondly, we allow traders to sell stocks without actually owning a stock, known
as short selling in financial markets.
Comparable to financial markets, short selling needs some restrictions in predic-
tion markets. If traders want to buy stocks they are limited through their initial
cash endowment and subsequent cash changes. Since short selling involves sell-
ing stocks that traders do not possess there is no natural, corresponding limit for
selling stocks. In short selling enabled prediction markets there is the need for a
short selling restriction equivalent to the budget constraint for buying stocks.
There are several possibilities to implement short selling in prediction markets
and to implement short selling constraints. The market operator could generally
function as a credible lender of stocks. It is important to make sure that mar-
ket participants are liquid enough to meet their short obligations once trading
in a specific stock ends. One basic approach is to implement a fixed constraint
through the number of shares that a trader can go short. Other possibilities in-
clude dynamic implementations which are based on potential losses a trader
would have to realize in extreme cases through short selling. In our opinion
there is no general rule how to implement short selling constraints. However an
approximation of the maximum number of borrowed stocks is given by equation
3.2.
Max. Number o f Borrowed Stocks =
Port f olio Value
Max. Loss
(3.2)
In the case of the EIX market the maximum loss is practically limited through
the EIX market design. The highest expected stock price is 200 (e.g. a 10 %
growth rate per quarter). Thus the maximum expected loss is selling a stock
for 0 and a payout of 200. Following these practical considerations we set the
Max. Loss to 200. Hence, the maximum number of borrowable stocks varies for
each market participant. The actual borrowing takes place while trading. Stocks
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Figure 3.1: Allowing short sales
in which short selling is allowed are marked by a small icon on the web-interface.
If a trader sells more stocks than she owns, the market (operator) automatically
acts as the lender. Consequently, borrowed stocks are interpreted as liabilities
in the portfolio value calculation. The last aspect considered is the timing of
the short sale allowance. Short selling was allowed in single stocks from March
15th till the 31st of October 2010. In order to test the effect of short selling on
market forecast accuracy we introduced short selling for each stock separately.
Short sales were allowed at noon, 15 respectively 25 days before the data release
(Figure 3.1). This allows us to analyze the effect for each individual stock.
3.2.3 Incentives
As mentioned, the market is a free to join play money market. In order to mo-
tivate participants intrinsically we provide two interface features; traders can
follow their performance on a leader board and they can form groups with oth-
ers to spur competition with friends. Previous research in the field of predic-
tion markets has shown that play-money markets perform as well as real-money
markets predicting future events (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004; Servan-Schreiber
et al., 2004). Due to the legal restrictions on gambling the EIX prediction market
has to rely on play money. To increase participants’ motivation and to provide
incentives to contribute information we hand out prizes worth 36,000 Euro. In
order to be useful, an accurate prediction must be determined well in advance of
the actual outcome. From a forecasting perspective it seems meaningless to run
a market where one obtains the prediction just before the actual outcome occurs.
This sounds obvious, but it is actually quite difficult to achieve, because traders
want to know how their investment turned out, fairly quickly. As we try to fore-
cast longer periods the incentive scheme has to address this problem. So the
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incentives are divided in two parts (a) monthly prizes and (b) yearly prizes. The
8 yearly prizes (total value 10,000 Euro) were handed out according to the port-
folio ranking at the end of the market. The monthly prizes are shuffled among
participants who fulfill two requirements for the respected month: (i) they in-
crease their portfolio value and (ii) they actively participate by submitting at
least five orders. Both incentives are clearly communicated through the web-
interface. For the yearly prizes the leader board indicates the current status of
all participants. The monthly winning status is displayed individually just after
each login.
Due to a lower number of sponsors, the amount of prize money was reduced
in the second round. We handed out three prizes worth 1,030 Euro per month;
12,360 Euro overall.
3.3 The Trading Software
3.3.1 IT Software Architecture
In addition to the key design elements of the EIX prediction market described
in the previous section one also has to design the web-based trading software as
well as the facilities handling information about the traders’ accounts, the order
matching and quote updates from a technical point of view. The EIX prediction
market software is an advancement of two previously run markets (Stathel et al.,
2009). The system is implemented in Grails4. It features a modularized architec-
ture in order to keep it easy to maintain and expendable by services and func-
tionality. Due to the previously unknown number of users the software platform
has to be scalable. Figure 3.2 summarizes the whole system from three perspec-
tives; IT-infrastructure, application logic and the core order management. The
IT-infrastructure is provided by the Forschungszentrum Informatik, Karlsruhe
(FZI), it consists of three physical servers; a Squid reverse proxy, caching the
static pages, a designated PostgreSQL server for the database and a tomcat ap-
plication server; running the application logic. The application logic has been set
4www.grails.org
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Figure 3.2: Software system
up following the model-view-controller concept. Therefore, it is separated in
three layers; one handling the external communication e.g. the website presen-
tation, one for the internal database querying and finally one running the core
order processing. As the core element the order management processes all incom-
ing orders. The EIX market employs the commonly used trading mechanism;
the continuous double auction (CDA). In a CDA, known e.g. from the Deutsche
Börse system Xetra, traders submit buy and sell orders which are executed im-
mediately if they are executable against orders on the other side of the order book
(Madhavan, 1992). If orders are not immediately executable, orders are queued
in an order book and remain there until they are matched with a counter-offer,
or are actively deleted by either the market operator or the submitting partici-
pant. Orders are executed according to price/time priority, i.e. buy orders with
a higher limit and vice versa sell orders with a lower limit take priority. In case
several orders were placed with the same limit price, the orders which were sub-
mitted earlier are executed first. One of the main advantages of using a CDA is
the fact that markets with a CDA pose no financial risk for market operators as
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they are a zero-sum game. Moreover, the CDA allows for continuous informa-
tion incorporation into prices and consequently traders are capable of quickly
reacting to events.
3.3.2 Trading Interface
The default trading interface is displayed in Figure 3.3. On the first arrival, the
participant only sees the trading mask (box upper left side marked with 0). It
contains the necessary options and fields to submit an order. First the user de-
cides whether to buy or sell the selected stock. Changing the order type adapts
the trading interface. For example, the small icon changes for a buy order to a
shopping cart which is going to be filled. The label next to the limit price changes
from lowest price to highest price.
In the third row the participant then specifies the limit price. She can change
the limit price three ways. Firstly by inserting the number directly (with a max-
imum of two decimals) or secondly by typing in her prediction, which is then
translated into a limit price. Or thirdly by using the arrows to increase or de-
crease the prediction and limit price by one increment.
According to Thaler et al. (2010) the default settings in systems matter. Hence,
the defaults were chosen purposefully not to distract or anchor participants to
certain values. The order type is set to sell. Previous experience indicates that
participants are slightly biased towards the buy action (Stathel et al., 2009). The
order size is set to 100 which represents 10 % of the start portfolio and the default
limit price (prediction estimate) is set to 100 (0 %). In the last row the user has to
specify the number of stocks being bought or sold. As additional information,
the system provides the current portfolio for a sell order and the highest number
of stocks a user can buy with the current specified limit price. Moreover, a short
description of the market comprising the respective payoff function was shown
as part of the trading screen.
Participants are able to customize their trading interface individually. By click-
ing the small arrows seven information panels open and close. In the default
setting, only the trading mask and the seven headlines are visible. Hence, par-
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ticipants have convenient access to the order book with 10 levels of visible depth
(1), the price development (2), the account information (3) and market informa-
tion (4) such as the last trading day. As additional information the Handelsblatt
provides access to an up-to-date economic news-stream (5) and finally the indi-
cator’s last years performance (6) is displayed. In the second version, we added
a panel to display a list of previous forecasts (7). The list contains all orders of the
selected product submitted by the currently logged-in participant. Furthermore
participants are able to directly cancel previous orders. After each submitted
Figure 3.3: Default trading screen
order the chosen interface is saved per user. When the user returns, the sys-
tem opens the previously used interface elements on default. The advantage is
twofold; users have a convenient option to customize their trading experience
and, we can assess which self-selected information pieces may have influenced
the participants’ decision processes. Moreover, we did not have to form groups
with different interfaces and assign users to certain groups. This setting would
possibly create an unfair experience. Additionally to the default trading inter-
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Figure 3.4: Two trading wizards
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Figure 3.5: Navigation bar
face, participants have the choice to switch to a trading wizard guiding their
trading decisions (Figure 3.4). In order to test for the interface influence on trad-
ing performance we designed two different wizards marked with Wizard1 and
Wizard2. Participants are randomly assigned in one of two groups with access
to one of the two different trading wizards. Interface Wizard1 is designed as a
three step trading wizard, with three (green) boxes appearing in sequence. In the
first step participants indicate if they believe the prediction to be higher or lower
than the current market forecast. In the second step they are asked about their
confidence in their prediction. The third box just displays the generated order.
Interface Wizard2 simply asks the participant to indicate a prediction interval
with two handles. On the right hand side an order is automatically generated
depending on the current orderbook and the distance between lowest and high-
est indicated prediction value. It is noteworthy that both wizards provide far less
information than the default interface. In terms of Seuken et al. (2010) interface
type Wizard1 can be considered as a weakly hidden market interface, whereas
type Wizard2 hides the market completely . Figure 3.5 displays the full EIX menu
structure. The portal also provides more information on the prizes traders can
win, the operational principle of the prediction market including a video tutorial
and frequently asked questions, as well as an up-to-date news stream related to
the German economic development. The second menu item holds the available
account information for individual traders including the number of shares held
in each contract, the balance of the cash account, the total value of their deposit,
a list of outstanding buy and sell orders, as well as a list of trades. The last item
leads to a ranking of all the traders sorted by their deposit value, i.e. the balance
of their cash account plus the value of the contracts they held at the specific point
in time.
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3.3.3 Feedback Mechanisms
In our market setting we distinguish between four types of feedback:
• Interface feedback
• Market based feedback
• Forecast performance feedback
• Participation feedback
Figure 3.6: Feedback on default trading screen
The first feedback type is directly communicated through the trading interface. If
participants enter a limit price another field displays the related prediction for
that price. Vice versa, participants can change their prediction and see that the
related price adapts automatically (See figure 3.6, F). This feature helps to com-
municate the complex contract design previously described.
Market based feedback is communicated on various levels. First of all stock prices
reflect the current aggregated belief of other market participants. Moreover the
orderbook displays the current market confidence about a certain event (e.g.
with a high spread). Finally, after contracts are liquidated, participants can easily
follow their own contribution in relation to their peers. This confronts forecast-
ers with their own forecasting performance. Additionally as good forecasters
increase their portfolio value they gain more weight over market run-time.
Aggregating trading success in order to create a portfolio-based ranking is the
standard way of giving forecast performance feedback. In order to separate be-
tween trading performance and forecasting performance the platform offers ad-
ditional performance-feedback; the so-called "EIX-score". It is calculated based
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Figure 3.7: Participation feedback
on the observed outcome, i.e. the fundamental value of each stock. If an order
moved the price in the right direction with respect to the final outcome of the
stock, it is informed; whereas an order moving the price in opposite direction to
the final outcome price, it is uninformed. Therefore we can ex-post measure the
information content of each order. Combining the information content with the
size of an order and aggregating all individual contributions enables us to calcu-
late a forecast based performance ranking. Participation feedback is communicated
directly after a user submits an order. Mazarakis et al. (2011) show that feedback
and recognition increases participants’ intrinsic motivation to contribute to pub-
lic goods projects. Following previous work we created six treatment groups.
Figure 3.7 depicts five of them. The 6th. group is a randomized treatment group
which gets randomly one of the five feedback types after each submitted bid. All
groups get a confirmation that their order was successfully submitted. We call
this the no feedback group. The other feedback treatments are:
• Gratitude which is a simple "Thank you"-message displayed after a contri-
bution.
• A Historical Reminder which shows the user her number of contributions in
order to think about her own past contribution behavior.
• A Relative Ranking displays the contribution frequency compared to peers.
• A Social Ranking feedback, which illustrates a ranking within a group of
users who created similar contributions.
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N= 1227 1 (very good) 2 3 4 5 6 (unsatisfactory)
Economic Knowledge 10.11 % 40.10 % 34.31 % 9.78 % 3.59 % 2.12 %
Market Knowledge 10.19 % 35.21 % 34.96 % 11.65 % 5.79 % 2.20 %
Table 3.2: Participant statistics
3.4 Market Participants
The registration at the EIX-market is free and requires besides a valid email ad-
dress just minimal personal information. Upon registration we asked partic-
ipants to self-assess their market-knowledge and their knowledge of German
economy. Furthermore, participants indicate if they are working in areas re-
lated to exchanges or economic forecasting; with 37.16 % indicating that they
do. Table 3.2 summarizes the first participant statistics. The user input is highly
correlated (ρ = 0.74), meaning that particpants indicating high knowledge in the
market domain do the same in the economic domain. In further analysis we
combine the scales to a confidence proxy. As a requirement for participants to
qualify for prizes, they had to provide information about their address and age.
Using the name and email-address to identify gender, it seems that most par-
ticipants are predominant male (93 %) and on average 53 years old. Finally, in
order to spur competition between friends, the first version of the portal offered
the possibility to create groups. Group members could invite acquaintances.
Within the group, members were able post messages and saw a group-internal
ranking, based upon the overall portfolio ranking. Additionally the group port-
folio is summed-up and a separate group-ranking is displayed, with all groups
ranked according to their performance. During the first round only 44 partici-
pants formed 12 groups.
3.5 Experimental Timeline
Figure 3.8 displays the EIX market development. Even though the experiment
was intended to stay relatively stable over the time horizon, some changes were
necessary to keep participants interested and active.
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Figure 3.8: Experiment timeline
To begin with, on Christmas eve 2009, we handed out 500 additional units of
every tradable stock as a Christmas present. As with all market changes, we an-
nounced this action in advance through the weekly newsletter and directly on
the web site.
We received feedback from market participants that stocks are overvalued.
However, with no more stocks to sell they had no opportunity to correct the
price. Hence, short selling was allowed in single stocks beginning in March 15th
2010. Similarly we received feedback asking for more indicators to be traded. In
response we introduced the Ifo business climate index in July 2010. This means
that participants received three times 1,000 stock units for the following three
periods.
The first round (version one) of the EIX prediction market ended on the 31st Oc-
tober 2010. In parallel we started the second round (version two) on October the
first. Every market participant who registered for the first version was automat-
ically transfered to the second round. No new registration was required and the
website layout, web-address and institutional setting remained the same. How-
ever several market changes were realized.
First of all, we changed the payout function of two indicators. The Ifo index
was directly related to the price (Price = I f o − index (points)). The intention
was to make it easier for participants to translate a prediction into a limit-price.
As the predictions for the export indicator were performing the worst com-
pared to the other indicators we changed the payout function to improve the
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forecast quality. The new payout function was the Exports in billion minus 30
(Price = Exports(billion) − 30). The long-term average export value is around
70 billion per month. For the function we scaled the average (70) to 100 and
added/subtracted the difference to the average.
As the positive impact of short selling on market forecast quality became obvi-
ous, we extended the time horizon in which short selling is allowed. Five days
after a stock is introduced (handed out to participants) participants are allowed
to short-sell the respective stock.
In the second version the amount of prize money was reduced due to a lower
number of sponsors. We handed out three prizes worth 1,030 Euro per month.
Due to a missing year-end prize we adapted the incentive scheme. Traders are
rewarded on a monthly basis and not a yearly basis. To successfully communi-
cate the winning status we generate a score for every matched order.
As described previous Chapter, we can measure the information contained in
each order. If an order moved the price in the right direction with respect to the
final outcome of the stock, it is informed; whereas an order moving the price in
opposite direction to the final outcome price, it is uninformed. We use the score
definition in equation 2.8 and weight the score by the order quantity submitted.
As every order is linked to one market participant, we can aggregate the score to





scoreo,i f or i paid out in m (3.3)
The monthly score per user (p) is given by the sum of all users’ orders for stocks
which are paid out in the respective month (m). The top three market partici-
pants according to the score of each month were rewarded with one prize each.
Part of the preparation of the second version was a review of all functionalities.
Within this review we realized that only a small fraction of participants used the
feature to form groups. It seems that participants did not find it useful to create
groups without being explicitly incentivized to do so. In order to streamline the
platform, we removed this feature in the second round.
The trading interface was only slightly adapted. On the default trading interface
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a new panel displaying previous orders was added (Figure 3.3, panel 7). The
trading wizards remained the same. Regarding information logging, we added
a timer, measuring the time a user takes to submit an order.
In order to prohibit supposedly unintended user input we added a verifying
heuristic. The heuristic is based on the two aspects of long time historical aver-
age for an indicator and the previous average forecast of the user. For example,
if the submitted limit price deviates too much from the indicator’s historical av-
erage or if the limit price deviates beyond a threshold from the trader’s average
limit price the user is sent to another page. This page (Figure A.1) displays ei-
ther the historical average or the trader’s average limit price as a benchmark.
The trader can than either abort the order, change the limit price or just continue
to submit the order. In order to potentially measure the effect of such verifying
rules we record both the initial order as well as the finally submitted order.
As we received positive feedback and participation was still high in end of ver-
sion two, we continued to run the EIX-platform for another year. For the third
version we adapted the trading wizard and the website presentation was re-
designed (Figure A.3). However to report a full data-set, the following sections
will only cover version one and two.
3.5.1 EIX@facebook
In a parallel experiment we integrated an identical market as an application in-
side the social network facebook. For three month from May 2010 till August
2010, we invited students to trade in this market. As incentives (500 Euros)
and advertisement were kept low-key, only 50 traders signed up. This allows
us to compare the forecasts generated by thin and thick markets. Additionally
facebook provides insights into the trader connections which can be linked to
individual trading behavior (Teschner and Rehm, 2011). Due the small size of
the parallel market and it’s short duration there were no effects on the main EIX-
market.
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3.5.2 Mobile Application
In order to offer an alternative and more compelling way to participate in the
EIX, we decided to implement a mobile trading application (EIX-Market-App
hereafter EMA). The implementation consists of two parts; a back- and frontend.
In a first step we developed an application programming interface (API) to EIX’s
backend. We choose to implement a SOAP-interface, since it’s interoperable and
language-independent. The EIX-SOAP-API consists of nine methods related to
trading and two methods needed to track user behavior. A WSDL file was used
to generate the needed code with WSDL2Obj-C, an open source code generator.
As the core data model of EIX and EMA are slightly different, objects containing
the intersection of both models are used to exchange data between EMA and
EIX. Second and regarding the front-end, we developed the EIX-Market-App as
a mobile iPhone client for the EIX. EMA contains all core features of the EIX,
i.e. submit and cancel orders, check the own holdings in the stocks-depot, ac-
cess additional information like the order book, news, etc (Figure A.2). EMAs
frontend-design is a compromise of two design goals. First, EMA was intended
to be easy to use for new users. Second, existing EIX-users should be able to
use the App with minimal learning-effort. Due to the limited screen size of the
iPhone platform, it is not reasonable to use EIX’s web-interface without adapta-
tions. EMA’s frontend tries to be close to EIX’s web-interface by sharing the same
menu-structure and nomenclature. Analogous to EIX’s web-interface, EMA of-
fers seven stock related information screens linked from the trade screen (Figure
3.3). To allow research about user’s information usage prior to submitting an
order, the consumption of the six information panels (respectively screens, in
case of EMA) are logged in both systems. EIX and EMA both track the time a
user needs to create and submit an order as well as the information used in this
process (Teschner et al., 2012).
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3.6 Summary
A wide and important range of policy decisions are made on the informational
basis of economic forecasts such as Inflation. However, it is a well established
fact that traditional economic forecast models lack the necessary accuracy (Mc-
Nees, 1992; Schuh, 2001; Osterloh, 2008). Simplified, the current approaches mix
expert knowledge with historic extrapolation. They are thus inadequate to cap-
ture rapid economic changes.
We described a prediction market specifically designed to forecast the most im-
portant economic figures in Germany up to a three quarters in advance. The mar-
ket design tries to circumvent some known drawbacks which came up in previ-
ously employed digital contract markets. Moreover, we drastically increased the
potential forecast horizon from a couple of days to a couple of months. Besides
testing a new market design in the field, the EIX-market offers a good platform
to run web-based experiments. In the following chapter we will start by eval-
uating the market according to the measures described in the second chapter.
Thereafter we will present results from three experiments which were conducted
within the EIX.
Chapter 4
EIX - Data & Market Statistics
4.1 Introduction
IN the following section we apply the presented prediction market (quality)framework on the EIX prediction market. By splitting the market period in
two phases, the first and the second round (year or version) we try to draw
conclusions for market engineering. We start by presenting some descriptive
market statistics and then evaluate the market design according to the previ-
ously described framework. We will show that (1) the EIX market is an active
liquid market with (2) low and improving forecast errors and (3) performs well
in comparison to the Bloomberg survey.
4.2 Market Activity
The following data includes the time span from 30th October 2009 till 31st of
October 2011. In total 1,235 (1,006 in the first round) participants registered at
the EIX market, of those 809 (680) submitted at least one order. Altogether par-
ticipants submitted 79,334 (45,808) orders resulting in 34,028 (22,574) executed
transactions. In the respected time frame 107 (47) stocks were paid out. On aver-
age every stock was traded 645 times (SD. 424). Figure 4.1 depicts the number of
orders per day as a proxy for market activity over time. Due to a novelty effect
the activity was quite high in the first month. Activity went down to a stable
level and remained their for the rest of the experiment period. In general, one
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Figure 4.1: Market activity (number of orders per day) over time
Figure 4.2: Market activity from different perspectives
can see that trading activity was lower in the second version (on average 127
vs 86 orders per day.). One reason might be the lower overall prize value that
participants could win. The market activity, quantified as the number of orders
submitted, is displayed in four dimensions in Figure 4.2. The number of orders
per user is power law distributed. A few (power) traders submit the majority of
orders (Gini inequality coefficient of 0.86). As the market is open 24/7 whereas
financial markets operate only during office hours the trading activity is spread
out over the day. Trading activity is quite evenly distributed between 6 am and
1 am o’clock, with slight peaks during noon. There is high activity during work-
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Order Type Number of Orders
Round 1 (V1) Round 2 (V2)
Buy 22,776 49.72 % 17,030 50.80 %
Sell 23,032 50.28 % 16,496 49.20 %
Total 45,808 33,526
Table 4.1: Order statistics split by round and type
ing hours, and higher activity during the week compared to the weekend. It
seems that people trade while at work. On average users submitted orders with
an order size of 759 units (median 300). With prices between 90 and 140 this
results in a volume turnover of 93,320 (median 38,690). In Figure 4.2 the number
of submitted orders in each trade size category is displayed. Over 70 % of all
orders are sized between 50 and 1000 stock units.
We expected to find activity to be unevenly distributed between indicators, as
some arguably receive more media attention than others (e.g. GDP vs. Invest-
ments). But looking at the different indicators, our analysis shows that trading
activity is evenly distributed among them (Figure A.6). However, trading activ-
ity within one stock increases as the liquidation date approaches. Hence, trading
activity is the highest right before the stock is paidout. Splitting the number of
orders according to their type we see that users submitted almost as many buy
as sell orders (Table 4.1). The differences are insignificant in version one and
significant in version two (diff: 1.6%; t− stat. : 2.9; p− value < 5%).
4.3 Market Liquidity
The essential characteristic of a liquid market is that there are ready and willing
buyers and sellers at all times. Hence, the usually used liquidity measures are
adapted to prediction markets. Realized spreads and price impacts for example
are usually denoted in 15 or even 5 minute intervals. We calculate the realized
spreads and price impacts for longer time intervals (3 to 24 hours).
Table 4.2, first row presents the spread measures. The difference between
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Version 1 Version 2
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
Quoted Spread 171 78 367 67 38 171
Effective Spread 168 72 462 63 32 330
Quoted Spread at Trade 146 63 428 58 29 329
Realized Spread 3h 87 4 1043 22 19 247
Realized Spread 6h 80 4 1070 28 19 255
Realized Spread 12h 80 4.4 1055 25 19 153
Realized Spread 24h 78 4.4 1038 24 19 127
Price Impact 3h 71 15 1024 30 4 244
Price Impact 6h 78 17 1079 24 4 245
Price Impact 12h 78 18 1073 27 5 146
Price Impact 24h 81 2 1070 28 7 118
Table 4.2: Basic liquidity measures, averages over all stocks
quoted spread and quoted spread at trade (25 bps; t − stat. : 12.3; p − value <
0.1% in version one) shows that market participants observe the market and only
actively trigger transactions by submitting market orders when spreads and thus
implicit trading costs are low. Since quoted spreads at trade only measure the
trading costs for the smallest of trade sizes, a more accurate measure of execu-
tion costs are given with the effective spreads. The realized spread represents the
part of the effective spread that a liquidity supplier keeps as revenue. The price
impact measures the information content of a trade. It reflects the permanent
impact of a trade under the assumption that information impacts are permanent
(Harris, 2002). As Table 4.2 shows, the price impact increases if the measurement
time is longer and the realized spread decreases. One can follow that the market
needs some time to adopt to the information brought in by trades. Furthermore
by comparing spreads between version one and version two, we find that the
liquidity significantly increases in the second version. For instance the quoted
spread is 104 bps (t− stat. : 66.2; p− value < 0.1%) lower in the second version.
Table 4.3 displays the average quoted spreads separately for the five differ-
ent indicators. The last column gives the out-of-sample historic variability1 of
1The sample ranges from 2005 until mid 2009.
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Quoted Spread hist. Variability Illiq CSS
Exports 273 7.7 3.798 0.009
GDP 133 1.9 0.416 0.004
Ifo 231 11.7 0.453 0.012
Inflation 91 0.7 0.359 0.003
Investments 395 11.7 2.727 0.006
Unemployment 50 1.7 0.383 0.001
Table 4.3: Quoted spread, historic variability and spread estimates. Average values per
indicator (Version 1)
each indicator. The variability can be interpreted as a risk measure for investors.
Participants recognize the underlying risk as highly variable indicators, such as
Investments and Exports, have high spreads and indicators with low historic
variability exhibit low quoted spreads.
Quoted Spread = i + β ∗Variability (4.1)
Running an OLS regression on a quote by quote basis the estimate (β) is 13.5, (t−
stat. : 15.5; p− value :< 0.1%). An increase in the variability of 1 point increases
the quoted spread of the representing stock by 13 basis points on average. This
seems reasonable as the market participants acknowledge the underlying high
uncertainty and set the spreads accordingly.
In many prediction market datasets (e.g. Intrade) the orderbook data is not
available for analysis. However, in order to judge market quality it would be
beneficial to take liquidity into account. Hence, one might want to estimate the
spread. In order to be able to use such estimates, we must first evaluate if spread-
estimation measures can be applied in (thin) prediction market settings. As we
have the actual spreads available in the EIX market, we can correlate estimates
and spreads. The exact definitions of the measures are given in chapter two.
Next, we will apply and validate the spread estimates. Table 4.3 depicts the
average estimate for each indicator separately. For comparison reasons we also
present the quoted spread. We correlate the different measures on an indicator
54 EIX - Data & Market Statistics
level using following OLS regressions:










In order to control for indicator effects we add the indicator dummies M1 −
M5. The CSS measure is positively correlated (t− stat. : 33.1; p− value < 0.1%),
the Illiq measure is negatively correlated to the quoted spread (t − stat. : −4.4;
p− value < 0.1%). As expected, the CSS measures liquidity and Illiq measures
the market illiquity. We find that both measures can be used to approximate
liquidity in thin prediction markets.
4.4 Information Measures
In prediction markets in which we can observe the outcome, i.e. the fundamen-
tal value of each stock we can ex-post measure the information content of each
order. This can be used to identify well informed traders, so called lead-users
(Spann and Skiera, 2004). For prediction markets in which we cannot readily
observe the outcome such as the foresight exchange (Graefe et al., 2010) or in-
novation markets (Stathel et al., 2010) one might use the price impact as a proxy
for the information content of a trade. The price impact approximates the per-
manent information impact of a trade. As the price impact of each order can
be measured at various points of time after trade execution, we evaluate four
different time points and correlate the results on a trade by trade basis with the
EIX-Score (equation 2.8). As one can see from Table 4.4 the later the measurement
point (PI24h) the higher the correlation with the EIX-Score.
We can conclude that such a measure can successfully be applied to identify
well informed traders, even though the outcome might not be known. A more
detailed analysis of identifying valuable participant input and experts can be
found in Teschner and Weinhardt (2012a).
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PI3h PI6h PI12h PI24h
Score 0.012 0.015 0.023 0.039
p-value < 10% < 5% < 1% < 0.1%
Table 4.4: Correlating: Score and price impact at different time points
From a market operator perspective it might be interesting to evaluate the prob-
ability of informed trading (PIN, see equation 2.10). For example might be to
measure the effect of market micro-structure changes on the probability of in-
formed trading. In our case we measure the effect of days till stock liquidation
on PIN. The reduction of PIN is illustrated in Figure 4.3. Regressing the number
Figure 4.3: Probability of informed trading. (Number of days before an instrument is
paid out)
of days before an instrument is paid out on PIN, we find that the probability
decreases before instrument liquidation (estimate: -0.001 per day; t− stat. : 4.19;
p − value < 0.1%). In the regression we additionally controll for the absolute
number of trades which has no influence on PIN. This is in line with finance lit-
erature, which suggests that PIN measures the risk that a trader faces a better
informed trader. This also implies that uncertainty about the underlying event
is reduced over time.
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4.5 Forecast Performance
As previously described, forecast performance is a multi-dimensional concept.
Hence we will describe the results from various perspectives. We aim at exter-
nally validating the generated forecasts by comparing them to the Bloomberg
survey forecast, the industry standard. Furthermore, we will internally validate
different contract designs by comparing forecast errors between EIX version one
and EIX version two. We start by detailing simple error measures.
4.5.1 Error per Indicator
On an aggregated level we compare the market generated forecasts eight days
before the data release ( f orecast8,i) to the fundamental value. Table 4.5 summa-
rizes the findings. We start by testing for a forecast bias. Hence, we test if the
mean of the market forecasts is different from zero. As the t-statistics indicate
there is no systematic bias in the forecast. This holds when separating the first
an second version. As the mean error in the second version seem to be smaller
we test on the difference between the two versions as well. However there is no
significant difference. Testing for the difference in the standard deviations we
find that the version two has a lower variance (F− stat. : 33.6, p < 0.1%).
Pooled Version 1 Version 2 Difference (V1-V2)
Mean Error 1.76 3.47 0.33 3.14
SD 16.8 24.5 4.24 16.8
Bias (t-stat.) 1.1 0.9 0.6 -
Table 4.5: Forecast performance comparison of version one and two. Average price dif-
ference (error) between fundamental values and stock prices t-8. Testing for a systematic
bias (if the mean error equals 0)
By comparing the standard deviations between forecasts and fundamental
values we find that the produced forecasts are significantly less volatile than
the fundamental values (1.41 vs 2.92; F − stat. : 4.29, p < 0.1%) in the respected
period. Thus we conclude that market forecast are more stable than the outcome
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values. This is in line with forecasts from other methods (Vajna, 1977). A reason
for this is that forecasters regularly tend to publish moderate, conservative
estimates rather than extreme values.
Table 4.6 reports various error measures for the different market categories. In
order to make the market forecasts comparable, we transform the market prices
back to predictive values. The transformation is the inverse payout function de-
fined in Table 3.1. We compare the forecast errors (a) within the market and (b)
between the market and two external benchmarks. The first simple benchmark
is a naive forecast which can be created by using the last value to predict the
following. Usually this is referred to as Autoregressive Model (AR(1)-Model).
The other benchmark is the Bloomberg consensus forecast. Consensus forecasts
has provided macroeconomic forecasts for industrialized countries since Octo-
ber 1989. Every Friday consensus publishes a number of prominent financial
and economic analysts, and reports their individual forecasts as well as simple
statistics summarizing the distribution of forecasts. For comparison reasons we
use the mean of the forecast distribution. It is also this “consensus” forecast that
receives the most attention as a summary assessment of the views of the private
sector (Prakash and Loungani, 2001). As the publication date is fixed on Fridays
the time between the forecast and the official data release varies. In order to en-
sure that the market forecast is unaffected from the Bloomberg forecast we use
the market generated forecasts eight days before the data release. Forecasts are
provided for all but for the Investment indicator. As the indicators have different
baselines and units, the absolute error (MAE, Table 4.6) does not allow a com-
parison between various indicators but only a comparison to Bloomberg. The
same holds for the MAPE. It becomes clear that some categories exhibit higher
error values than other. This stems from the fact that some indicators such as
Investments and Exports are highly variable. Moreover, the difference in the
MAPE between the first version and the second version is due to different base-
lines. The Exports in version one are measured as the percentage change (MoM),
whereas in version two the market predicts the absolute number in billions. In
order to measure the relative accuracy within the market and between different
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categories we normalize the error values using Theil’s U. The higher the Theil’s
U the lower the relative accuracy (Leitch and Tanner, 1991). Moreover, if the
Theil’s U statistic is lower than one, the forecasting technique is better than the
naive forecast. As all Theil’s U values are lower than one, we conclude that on
average the market beats a naive forecast. To put that in perspective, Osterloh
(2008) shows the naive forecast is often as good as the expert prediction for eco-
nomic indicators. We see that exports are better in round one than the Bloomberg
forecast, however in version two they perform equally well. The same is true for
the GDP forecast. In the Inflation and Ifo-Index the Bloomberg forecast performs
better. Finally, the market outperforms Bloomberg in the unemployment indica-
tor. Hence, we find that the direct forecast comparison shows that they perform
equally good.
Next we will analyze a within-market measure; the information efficiency. Ta-
ble 4.7 presents the results of the previously presented OLS regression testing
for forecast efficiency (see regression 2.13). If one of the estimates would be eco-
nomically significant different from zero, the forecast revisions would not follow
a random walk and one could assume a bias. However we find significant neg-
ative autocorrelation. Hence, the weak form forecast efficiency is not fulfilled
which means that the forecast at a certain point of time does not contain all avail-
able information. Moreover, we find both the coefficients and the t-statistics to
be higher in round two. It seems that information aggregation worked better in
the first version.
We also run a Fair and Shiller (1989, 1990) regression, attempting to predict
economic data releases on the basis of our two alternative forecasts. In order
to compare both forecasts, we use a market forecast from eight days before the
data release, which in all cases is before the Bloomberg release. Comparing the
forecasts; the Bloomberg-based forecast has a large and extremely statistically
significant weight, describing that it encompasses all information. Investigating
further we find that the Bloomberg’s superiority is mainly due to the market’s
poor performance in the exports indicator. Comparing the two version, we find
that the market carries more information in comparison to Bloomberg in the sec-
ond round. There are two possible reasons, the first is that Bloomberg’s forecast
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Figure 4.4: Absolute forecast error over time. Left side first version vs. second version
right side.
performance decreased over time. This seems unlikely given there long expe-
rience and unchanged methodology. A second explanation could be that the
market performance improved over time. Taking the results from Table 4.6 and
Table 4.5 into account, the second explanation seems more likely.
4.5.2 Forecast Error Reduction
An important question is if the market continuously aggregates information. In
Figure 4.4 the average absolute error over time is depicted. One can see a steady
decreasing absolute error in the last 70 days.





We run a OLS-regression analysis to quantify the error reduction per day. In
order to control for different indicator effects we add the market dummies
M1 −M5. We then apply the same regression for different markets and the two
versions separately. Table 4.9 presents the results.
In the last 70 days the average error is reduced by 0.012 per day (t− stat. : 7.0;
p− value ≤ 0.1%). Turning to the differences between version one and two, we
see that the coeffient is lower in the second version. This due to the fact that in
version one the error on day 70 is much higher than in version two (see Figure
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4.4). Hence the reduction per day is lower in the second version. We conclude
that forecast uncertainty was reduced over time, information aggregation took
place and hence the absolute error was reduced.
4.5.3 Predicting Forecast Error
Another important question for interpreting point forecasts is the uncertainty at-
tached to the forecast. Neither Bloomberg nor market forecasts provide explicit
uncertainty information. However, one might interpret implicit market prop-
erties as proxies for the underlying uncertainty. One possible implicit market
measure for market confidence is liquidity. Another proxy for market uncer-
tainty could be a high price variability which indicates the traders’ disagreement
with the fundamental price of an asset. Furthermore, we include the difference
between the highest and lowest price (Distancei). Last but not least, the higher
the number of traders who are active in one stock, the more likely it is that all
available information has been incorporated (Van Bruggen et al., 2010).









We run an OLS regression to analyze if the four factors predict the forecast er-
ror magnitude. Table 4.10 presents the results. An increase in the quoted spreads
by one point increases the forecast error by 1.7 points on average. This seems
reasonable as the market participants acknowledge the underlying high uncer-
tainty and set the spreads accordingly. All other implicit market measures have
no explanatory value. As we included market dummies a difference in quoted
spreads does not only indicate uncertainty due to differences in the underlying
indicator variability but differences within one indicator.
4.5.4 Combining Forecasts
Combining forecasts can reduce error in several ways. A combined forecast is
likely to be more accurate than a typical forecast of an individual component,
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because biases associated with the data and methods used in various forecasts
are likely to differ.
For our study we combine the market generated forecasts with the Bloomberg





In order to test whether forecasts can be further improved by simply combining
them, we compare the forecast errors. Table 4.11 lists the results. The forecast er-
ror is the lowest for the combined forecasts (testing the difference to Bloomberg;
t− stat.1.67, p− value < 10%). Moreover, the variance in the error is the lowest
as well.
4.6 Summary
In this section we provided an in-depth analysis of a new market for economic
outcomes. The following section highlights the findings from three perspectives.
Market design perspective: We first summarized findings from previous markets in
this domain and detailed the known shortcomings of the currently used binary
market designs. We proposed a radically different approach using a linear pay-
out function. The theoretical improvements are threefold; first of all, the number
of traded stocks is reduced. This leads to higher liquidity in the traded stocks.
Secondly the “partition-dependence” bias can been avoided and lastly informa-
tion can be aggregated continuously and over longer time horizons. Using the
continuous market engineering approach, we tried to improve the second ver-
sion by adapting the market. We find that in most measures the second version
performs better than the first version even though the lottery-prizes and overall
participation were lower. We strongly believe that by rigorously analyzing mar-
ket properties there is potential for further improvement.
Forecasting perspective: The market acts as a mechanism not only to aggregate
dispersed information but also to aggregate individual forecasts. It does so by
incentivizing participation and rewarding early, precise forecasts. Moreover the
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EIX-platform is yet alone in aggregating these forecasts continuously and for a
long time horizon. Turning to the community generated forecasts we find that
forecast accuracy improves constantly over time and that generated forecasts
performed well in comparison to the Bloomberg-survey forecasts. Furthermore,
forecast for all indicators beat the naive benchmark forecast. Additionally, we are
able to show that the market has three supplementary benefits. Market measures
can be used to identify valuable user input and forecast experts in real-time. De-
tecting such input might possibly enable us to improve the information aggre-
gation mechanism and the forecast performance of such systems. Additionally,
we can show that the market measures (quoted spreads) can be used to predict
the forecast error. Hence, the market provides an implicit but visible measure
for forecast confidence. In future this might enables us to enhance the market
forecast by providing this measure explicitly as forecast confidence. Finally, in
line with previous work, forecasts can be improved even more by combining
Bloomberg and market generated forecasts.
Market quality perspective: We rigorously applied the previously described frame-
work. The defined measures allow us to compare different market designs on a
meta-level in future work. Moreover, it allows us to benchmark against mar-
kets in which not the full dataset is available (e.g. Betfair or Intrade). Hopefully
the evaluation of these spread estimation measures allow us to address the still
missing prediction market meta study.
It seems fair to conclude that overall the market worked remarkably well. We
hope our approach will positively impact the market design community and
forecast results will eventually influence economic policy making in Germany
by providing continuous information about the state of the economy.
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revt−1 revt−2 revt−3
(t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.)
Version 1 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01(-5.2) (-3.8) (-3.2)
Version 2 -0.5 -0.23 -0.05(-28.5) (-12.4) (-3.9)
Table 4.7: Weak-form forecast efficiency
Bloomberg EIX (t-8)
(t-stat.) (t-stat.)
Exports 1.15 -0.13(2.5) (-0.3)
GDP 5.17 -4.14(3.8) (-3.2)
Ifo 1.15 -0.14(5.4) (-0.7)
Inflation 1.23 -0.23(6.1) (-1.15)
Unemployment -0.02 1.02(-0.19) (9.9)
Version 1 1.39 -0.37(4.7) (-1.3)
Version 2 -2.6 3.5(-1.7) (2.4)
Pooled 1.25 -0.25(5.6) (-1.17)
Table 4.8: Fair-Shiller regression
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Version 1 Version 2 Pooled
(t-stat.) (t-stat.) (t-stat.)
Export -0.25 0.01 -0.49(-3.7) (0.5 ) (-8.9)
GDP 0.12 -0.04 0.05(1.1) (-4.7) (0.7)
Ifo -0.05 -0.07 -0.06(-1.2) (-11.9) (-6.3)
Inflation -0.06 -0.05 -0.07(-9.9) (-10.4 ) (-15.3)
Investment 0.11 -0.24 -0.03(0.9) (-8.4 ) (-0.5)
Unemployment -0.04 -0.03 -0.04(-13.9) (-13.5 ) (-20.4)
Pooled -0.08 -0.05 -0.12(-16.3) (-1.8) (-7.0)
Table 4.9: Forecast error reduction per day (last 70 days)
Variable Estimate (t-stat.)
Intercept -1.67 ( -0.5)
Quoted Spreadi 1.77 (2.1)
Var(pricei) -0.00 ( -0.1)
unique tradersi 0.03 ( 1.3)
Distancei 0.01 ( 0.1)




EIX 11.50 0.08(28.0) (0.3)
Bloomberg 7.08 0.06(20.3) (0.3)
Combined 6.60 0.05(19.3) (0.2)
Table 4.11: Combining forecasts

Chapter 5
Short Selling in Prediction Markets
5.1 Introduction
SHORTLY after the beginning of the global financial crisis, several stock ex-change regulators banned short selling on financial markets (SEC, 2008).
They argue that this was necessary to maintain properly operating markets for
securities trading and to ensure the stability of the financial system. An ongoing
debate in finance is whether short selling has positive or negative effects on mar-
ket quality. While financial market experts stress the importance of short sales
for market liquidity and price discovery, many retail investors attribute the mar-
ket turmoil in 2009 also to short selling. Analyzing the EIX prediction market
data, we assesses the consequences of the introduction of short selling on mar-
ket forecast accuracy, a proxy for market quality. Using an event-study approach
we find that introducing short selling further improves the EIX market forecast
accuracy. By allowing traders to short sell, mispricing is reduced and hence mar-
ket forecasts are closer to actual macroeconomic outcomes.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: the next section starts by
summarizing previous work on short selling effects on market quality and effi-
ciency. Additionally we present the evaluation methodology. The subsequent
section then analyzes the market from a forecasting perspective and quantifies
the effect of short selling. Finally, section four concludes this chapter.
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5.2 Related Work
We believe that the concept of short selling is important to complex prediction
markets and facilitates predictive power. But what changes for participants if
they are able to short sell in a prediction market? The calculation of a stock’s
value on the buyer side is quite simple. If a trader estimates a stock’s expected
future value higher than the best price asked by a seller, then this trader should
buy this stock. The calculation for sellers is a bit more subtle with short selling.
Traders who believe that a stock’s future value is lower than the best current
price offered by a buyer should sell short, i.e. accepting the current bid price in
exchange for a liability that is based on a stock’s future value.
5.2.1 Short Selling in Financial Markets
In financial markets there is an important distinction between covered short sales
and naked short sales. Covered short selling occurs if an investor actually pos-
sesses the shares that she is selling, for instance through borrowing shares from
a third party. The investor then usually pays a lending fee to the owner of the
shares. When such a short position is closed, the investor returns the shares to
the lender. In financial markets a third party lending shares might be a bank or
insurance company with a large portfolio of securities. In the case of naked short
selling a trader does not possess the shares she is selling and she does not make
any arrangements to borrow shares at the time of the sale. Often, only market
makers are allowed to short sell naked. They resolve their inventory intra-day
or at least before a trade is settled (Boulton and Braga-Alves, 2010).
Financial research suggests that short selling is an important mechanism for effi-
cient prices and the reflection of private information through asset prices. Jones
and Lamont (2002) find support for the hypothesis that stocks which are ex-
pensive or impossible to short are overpriced. In trading environments with
little public information short sales are important to reveal private information
through order flow (Cohen et al., 2007). Short sales in general disclose bad news
to markets (Aitken et al., 1998). Additionally, short sales can improve price accu-
racy. On the one hand they give incentives to traders to gather new information,
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on the other hand they help to better reflect already available information in the
market (Fox et al., 2011).
5.2.2 Event Studies
Event study methodology is a widely used instrument in financial market re-
search. It enables the researcher to capture the effect of an event on a share price.
In order to do this, a time series of the asset’s return is needed, e.g. on monthly
or daily basis. The time series is split into an estimation window and an event
window. According to equation 5.1 an abnormal return ARit for asset i at time
t is computed. Rit denotes the actual return and Kit the expected return, also
called normal return (Brown and Warner, 1980).
ARi,t = Ri,t − Ki,t (5.1)
The simplest model for estimating normal returns is the so called constant mean
return model (CMR) (MacKinlay, 1997). It establishes the normal returns as the
mean of the returns in the estimation window. Other models use the correlation
with market wide return movement in order to calculate the normal return. Fi-
nally, abnormal returns are aggregated over all examined assets and are tested
for significance in the event window.
5.2.3 Event Studies in Prediction Markets
Event studies were already successfully used on prediction markets. Elberse
(2007) conducts an event study on the Hollywood Stock Exchange and finds
that star actors have a positive impact on movies’ revenues. Slamka et al. (2008)
compare the performance of the event study methodology in a play-money and
in a real-money prediction market. They find that both settings are likewise
suitable for conducting event studies.
In order to capture the impact of short selling on forecast accuracy we use an
event study approach on daily basis. We choose to set the estimation window to
30 days. The event window is the day where short sales are introduced. At the
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end of each day t in estimation and event window we calculate the errori,t for
asset i as follows:
errori,t = | f vi −Midi,t| (5.2)
In the equation f vi denotes the fundamental value and Midi,t the mid price. For
the event study methodology the relative error change can then be interpreted as
a return. Abnormal and normal relative error changes can be interpreted anal-
ogously. We check for occurrences of potentially disturbing events in the event
window with the help of the economic news-stream of the EIX market, but do
not find anything striking.
Following Elberse (2007) we use a constant mean return model to estimate the
normal relative error change. We test the significance of the abnormal relative
error change with the t-statistic proposed by (Brown and Warner, 1985). The test
statistic is calculated as follows:
t− stat. = errort√
Var(errort)
(5.3)
Where errort is the mean of errors at event time t. The test statistic converges to
a standard normal distribution.
Additionally, we conduct a nonparametric Corrado (1989) rank test in order to
verify the results without assuming underlying standard normal distributions.
For the Corrado test, ranks are assigned to the abnormal returns in ascending
order. Let t = 0 denote the event day, κi,0 the rank of the event day of asset i
and E(κi) the mean of the assigned ranks. Then the test statistic is computed








Where Var(κ) is the variance of 1N ∑
N
i=1(κi,t − E(κi)). The test statistic is asymp-
totically standard normally distributed.
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5.3 Setting and Research Question
Introducing the concept of short selling in a complex prediction market allows
us to test the effect of short-selling on market quality and forecast performance.
The deviation between the market prediction and market outcome provides a
direct test of market efficiency. Hence, the research question is whether the in-
troduction of short selling reduces the deviation (e.g. forecast error).
In order to test the effect of short selling on market efficiency and quality with an
event study approach, we gradually introduced short selling in the EIX market.
This means that short selling was allowed in single stocks from March 15th till
the 31st of October 2010. We introduced short selling for each stock separately.
Short sales were allowed at noon, 15 respectively 25 days before the data release.
This allows us to analyze the effect for each individual stock.
5.4 Results
The following section first presents some descriptive market statistics and then
evaluates the introduction of short sales according to the previously described
methodology. We will show that short-selling improves the forecast accuracy
and market liquidity.
5.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
The following data includes the timespan from 30th October 2009 till 31st of
October 2010. In total 1,006 participants registered at the EIX market, of those 680
submitted at least one order. We discard all stocks with less than 50 transactions.
In the respected time frame 47 stocks were paid out. In 29 stocks short selling
was introduced.
5.4.2 Market Performance
We conducted an event study for each indicator and the whole market sepa-
rately. Table 5.1 shows the results. Day 0 denotes the event day. A negative day
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Day 0 Rel. Abn. t-Test Corrado Rank Test No. of
Error Change p-Value p-Value assets
All indicators -0.31 < 5 % < 1 % 29
Exports -0.04 n.s. < 5 % 8
GDP 0.11 n.s. n.s. 3
Inflation -0.65 < 1 % < 1 % 8
Investments 0.62 n.s. n.s. 2
Unemployment -0.62 < 10 % < 1 % 8
Table 5.1: Results of the event study. (n.s.: not significant)
0 relative abnormal error change corresponds to an abnormal high forecast im-
provement when short selling is introduced.
Jointly for all indicators the t-test shows significance at the 5 % level for an ab-
normal error change of about -30.8 %. Forecast errors drop more than -60 %
abnormally for Unemployment and Inflation asset categories. They are signifi-
cant at the 10 % level, respectively 1% level. The Corrado rank test supports our
findings.
The small abnormal error change of 3 % for Exports shows significance at the
5% level only for the Corrado rank test. A possible explanation for this is that
Exports are highly volatile and therefore traders have difficulties to evaluate the
Exports assets, even with short selling allowed.
Results for GDP and Investments are not reliable as the test statistics are poorly
specified for only 3, respectively 2, data points. All in all, we draw the conclusion
that introducing short sales improves forecast accuracy of prediction markets.
5.4.3 Market Liquidity
Another important question for interpreting point forecasts is the uncertainty at-
tached to the forecast. Neither Bloomberg nor market forecasts provide explicit
uncertainty information. However, one might interpret implicit market proper-
ties such as quoted spreads as proxies for the underlying uncertainty. Hence, we
check, if quoted spreads change after introducing short selling. In order to do
so, we compare the spreads 30 days prior to the event day to the spreads past
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Pre-event Post-Event Satterthwaite F-Test
Mean Mean t-Test p-Value p-Value
Exports 0.047 0.027 < 0.1% < 1%
GDP 0.017 0.007 < 0.1% < 0.1%
Inflation 0.013 0.005 < 0.1% < 0.1%
Investments 0.036 0.015 < 0.1% < 0.1%
Unemployment 0.004 0.002 < 0.1% < 0.1%
Table 5.2: Market liquidity pre and post short selling. Satterthwaite t-Test and F-test
results of quoted spread changes.
event day for each market segment.
Results are shown in table 5.2. For each market segment the F-test shows strong
significance below the 1 % level. Therefore, the equal variance hypothesis must
be rejected. We are aware of the fact that to some extent variance change of the
spreads may be due to closeness to the data release and because of that uncer-
tainty might be reduced. Nonetheless, there is a strongly significant change of
spread variances after introduction of short sales. Furthermore, the differences
of post- and pre-event sample means are striking. A Satterthwaite t-test is sig-
nificant at the 0.1 % level for all market segments. We conclude that introducing
short sales reduces quoted spreads respectively forecast uncertainty in predic-
tion markets.
5.5 Conclusion
Based on existing financial research we believe that short sales in prediction mar-
kets are an important factor to improve prediction accuracy and reduce biases.
This study supports this believe. In general, prediction markets function best
if market participants have the same market power independent of trade direc-
tion. The decision to buy or sell a stock should mainly be driven by a trader’s
estimate of a stock’s future value and not based on whether trading on expecta-
tions can be achieved through buying or selling a stock. Comparable to financial
markets, short selling needs some restrictions in prediction markets. If traders
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want to buy stocks they are limited through their initial cash endowment and
subsequent cash changes. Since short selling involves selling stocks that traders
do not possess there is no natural corresponding limit for selling stocks. In short
selling enabled prediction markets, there is the need for a short selling restriction
equivalent to the budget constraint for buying stocks.
There are several options to implement short selling in prediction markets and to
implement short selling constraints. The market operator could generally func-
tion as a credible lender of stocks. It is important to make sure that market partic-
ipants are liquid enough to meet their short obligations once trading in a specific
stock ends. One basic approach is to implement a fixed constraint through the
number of shares that a trader can go short. Other possibilities include dynamic
implementations which are based on potential losses a trader would have to re-
alize in extreme cases through short selling. In our opinion there is no general
rule how to implement short selling constraints. Such limits are rather predic-
tion market specific.
In a first step we present one way how short selling can be implemented in a
linear prediction market. In order to quantify the effect of the introduction,
we choose to allow short selling separately for individually stocks. All in all
we collected 29 time points when short selling was introduced. We then docu-
ment the positive effect of short selling on market accuracy using an event study
approach. Analyzing market quality, we find that due to the market changes,
spreads which are a proxy for market uncertainty are lowered.
We conclude that short selling in linear prediction markets is an essential char-
acteristic to enable high prediction accuracy. Future research involves empiri-
cal testing of different short selling implementations. It is important to analyze
whether specific short selling restrictions are actually needed and how trader
behavior changes through short selling.
Chapter 6
Incentives, Feedback & Learning in
Prediction Markets
6.1 Introduction
INTERNET communities -such as the EIX-market- offer the advantage of in-stant information exchange and group decision that is not possible in a real-
life. In the previous chapter we showed how such an online community can been
used to facilitate information aggregation of macroeconomic variables. This sub-
sequently leads to the question of how participants can be motivated to con-
tribute and share their information for longer time horizons. We try this by first
implementing a specifically designed market environment. Secondly, we design
a play-money incentive schemes which rewards participants according to their
performance. How well does this incentive scheme fulfill the goal of keeping
participants active and contributing? It is especially interesting of how good this
incentive system works for longer time horizons. An important part of the in-
centive mechanism is the communication of it. Participants have to intuitively
understand how their actions relate to an outcome and finally to a performance-
based (incentive) ranking. In (financial) markets this feedback loop is inherently
part of the mechanism. Traders gain or lose money. However, as prediction mar-
kets usually rely on play-money, it seems worth considering designing a feed-
back loop linking the actions and outcomes.
In public goods projects, non-monetary and participation feedback has been
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found to increase participants’ contributions. In order to further motivate par-
ticipants intrinsically we test five different feedback mechanisms. We test which
of the feedback types works best at motivating contributions. If we find any dif-
ferences in the activity level, do the additional contributions improve the com-
munity forecasts?
Related to the question of feedback is the notion of learning. Classical learning-
by-doing models suggest that traders might improve their ability as they actively
trade. Through their actions and provided feedback traders gain experience and
thus improve over time. The question arises how to improve the participant’s
learning process. In our platform learning occurs on three levels. Firstly, partici-
pants learn how to trade in a continuous double auction just as in stock markets.
Secondly, they learn about their own macroeconomic forecasting ability in com-
parison to their peers. Thirdly, by following market forecasts they learn about
the current state of the economy. Separating two distinct learning types we an-
alyze how learning takes place within the participating community. Further-
more, we evaluate the effect of performance feedback mechanisms on activity in
a market-based system.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: The second section gives a
brief review of incentives schemes and feedback in information exchanges. Fur-
thermore learning in markets is discussed. Section three presents the research
questions. The subsequent section evaluates the EIX-market from the three per-
spectives; incentives, feedback and learning. Finally section five concludes this
chapter.
6.2 Related Work
6.2.1 Incentive Schemes for Play-Money Markets
As pointed out by Servan-Schreiber et al. (2004) there are two essential factors
driving the prediction market accuracy; knowledge and motivation. One practi-
cal way to increase motivation is the promise of winning money. In real money
markets traders invest money and gain directly like in financial markets. Due to
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the legal restrictions on gambling, setting up a real-money market incurs huge
technical and regulatory costs. As an alternative, market operators can set up
play money prediction markets. Instead of real money, participants are endowed
with a virtual currency. Previous research has shown that play-money perform
as well as real-money markets predicting future events (Wolfers and Zitzewitz,
2004; Rosenbloom and Notz, 2006). Gruca et al. (2008) state that there is no dif-
ference if there is a lot of publicly available information otherwise real money
markets perform better. However, Rosenbloom and Notz (2006) argue that real
money markets may better motivate information discovery while play money
markets may yield more efficient information aggregation.
In order to encourage participation and information revelation in play money
markets, market operators shuffle prizes according to designed incentives
schemes. As there are various ways how such schemes can be designed, the
questions arises if the design influences market performance and trader behav-
ior. Luckner and Weinhardt (2007) study the impact of three different incentive
schemes on prediction accuracy in short-term laboratory experiments. They find
that that a rank-order scheme outperforms a fixed payment incentive scheme
and surprisingly a performance-compatible payment. Their results show that
rank-order tournaments are a suitable incentive schemes in case of risk-averse
traders. Moreover, they argue that competition in the rank-order treatment over-
rides risk aversion and in doing so leads to the best results in terms of prediction
accuracy.
Prediction markets work by incentivizing information revelation and participa-
tion. Hence traders can be rewarded based on their performance which is di-
rectly linked to the quality of their contributions. As Spann and Skiera (2003)
point out that participant motivation decreases if payout dates are too far in fu-
ture. It remains unclear how the participants can be incentivized in long term
field prediction markets.
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6.2.2 Feedback Mechanisms
IS literature indicates that system feedback highly influences the usage of infor-
mation systems (Bajaj and Nidumolu, 1998; Kim and Malhotra, 2005).
A common way to increase participants’ intrinsic motivation to contribute to
public goods projects is to give users feedback and recognition. Cheshire and
Antin (2008), as well as Ling et al. (2005), try to raise user contribution in on-
line communities through feedback mechanisms. Many motivational theories in
psychology include a feedback component such as the goal setting theory from
Locke (2001). According to Cheshire and Antin (2008) there are three different
feedback mechanisms which are assumed to lead to an increased contribution
rate.
• Gratitude is a simple “Thank you”-message displayed after a contribution.
Beenen et al. (2004) find that sending a one-time “Thank-you” email can
raise contributions.
• A Historical Reminder is a feedback mechanism, which informs the partici-
pant about the number of individual contributions. According to Cheshire
and Antin (2008) this may help the user to think about his own past contri-
bution behavior.
• Relative Ranking displays the contribution frequency compared to peers.
The knowledge about cumulative group behavior can be beneficial to the
production of a public good, like contributions to a wiki (Cheshire, 2007).
Additionally one might consider to use Social Ranking feedback, which illustrates
a ranking within a group of users who created a similar number of contributions.
One might argue that information about individuals with a similar ranking, and
therefore the same amount of contributions, leads to an increase in social com-
petition, and positively impacts the motivation to contribute. However -to our
knowledge- social rankings have not been tested yet. As most work on the effect
of feedback mechanisms on user participation and contribution relates to coop-
erative environments such as public wikis, it remains unclear if and how the
effects can be reproduced in more competitive environments such as electronic
markets.
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Besides the usage and adoption, feedback plays a major role in interacting with
the IS-user. An assumption underlying current models of learning is that learn-
ing takes place only through repeated experience of outcomes (Weber, 2003).
6.2.3 Learning in Markets
As prediction markets work like financial markets, they offer a learning envi-
ronment for trading in stock markets. Moreover, a recent study shows that pre-
diction markets can enable active learning in large groups (Buckley et al., 2011).
Participation in prediction markets changes the learning event from the passive
receipt of material and recall of facts to active decision making. Thus learners are
challenged to engage in the learning process. In a similar case-study a predic-
tion market was used as a teaching tool for MBA classes (Raban and Geifman,
2009). The authors conclude that students gained valuable insight into their own
decision making patterns as well as the hands-on activity helped to enhance the
understanding of markets and added value to the lessons. However, both explo-
rative studies use short-lived prediction markets as a pedagogical tool in closed
class-room environments.
Classical learning-by-doing models suggest that traders might improve their abil-
ity as they actively trade. Through their actions and provided feedback traders
gain experience and thus improve over time. A second type of learning is called
learning about ability. As investors trade, they might realize that their ability is
low and decide to stop trading. By analyzing investor records, Seru et al. (2010)
separate these learning types and find that most of the learning occurs as in-
dividuals learn about their own ability and low-ability investors stop trading.
Contrary to these results a study on retail investor behavior finds that excess
portfolio returns improve with account tenure - a proxy for investor experience.
Furthermore, they also find that trade quality significantly increases with expe-
rience (Nicolosi et al., 2009). In prediction market literature, learning has been
viewed from a forecasting perspective. Based on models of information aggre-
gation, Adams (2006) theoretically shows that when learning is allowed, a pre-
diction markets may aggregate information. In particular, adding learning to the
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Manski (2006)-model causes market prices to converge to the mean of the distri-
bution of beliefs. Hence the market learns the correct outcome probability over
time.
6.3 Setting and Research Question
The main research question is how participants can be motivated to contribute
and share their information for longer time horizons. We design a play-money
incentive scheme which rewards participants according to their performance
(see Section 3.2.3). Accordingly we have to evaluate how well the incentive
scheme fulfills the goal of keeping participants active and contributing. It is es-
pecially interesting to analyze how well this incentive system works for longer
time horizons.
Another question is, if market participants can be intrinsically motivated by cer-
tain IS-artifacts. In order to test this we implement five common feedback mech-
anisms (see Section 3.3.3). We then evaluate which of the feedback types works
best at motivating contributions. If we find any differences in the activity level,
do the additional contributions improve the community forecast?
As discussed, feedback is essential for a successful learning process. This subse-
quently leads to question of how participants can learn about their contribution
and improve their forecast performance over longer time horizons. Given that
participants learn to improve their forecast ability, do market generated forecasts
improve over time?
Extending the idea of a purely profit-based performance ranking we test if per-
formance feedback can be improved. We display two types of ranking; one high-
lighting the overall trading performance, one more directly aimed at displaying
forecast performance. How well do these artifacts work? Do participants learn-
ing from the performance feedback they receive in this setting? If we find any
learning effect, does this improve the macroeconomic forecasts? This leads to
the question of forecast accuracy in general. From a forecasting perspective, if
learning about the outcome occurs, the flow of information reduces outcome
uncertainty and hence results in decreasing forecast errors over time.
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Figure 6.1: Participants staying active
6.4 Results
In the following section we analyze the three interlinked topics of incentives,
feedback and learning.
6.4.1 Incentives
As described we designed an incentive scheme that aims at keeping participants’
motivation high over the market run-time. Figure 6.1 presents the number of
active participants on a monthly basis. We started the experiment with a small
number of participants in the very end of October 2009. We started to promote
the platform in the beginning of November 2009. This explains the low number
of active participants in the first month.
Ignoring this kick-off effect, we find a clear novelty effect, which is evident in the
high activity levels in the subsequent two months. While the number of active
participants decreases we find that the percentage of participants fulfilling the
monthly incentive requirements stays at the same level. The slight drop in the
last month is due to the fact that we started the second market round in parallel.
Over the second version, there is no general trend visible. Participants stay active
and contribute continuously over the market run-time. We conclude that the
incentive structure worked well for a such a long-running experiment.
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Figure 6.2: Effect of the newsletter
6.4.2 Feedback
In order to keep participants active and informed we sent out a weekly newslet-
ter summarizing the recent economic news. The sending days varied during
the week. Participants are able to sign-up (off) for receiving the newsletter on
the EIX portal. At the end of round one, 63 % (round two: 58 %) of all active
participants received the newsletter. Analyzing the impact of the newsletter, we
find an increased activity measured as orders per day (on average +60 orders on
sending days; t− stat. : 3.23, p− value≤ 1%). The peak activity on sending days
is followed in almost linear decreasing activity in subsequent five days (Figure
6.2).
We implemented five feedback mechanisms and added one control treatment
(no feedback). On sign-up participants were randomly assigned to one of the
treatment groups.




αi ∗ Fi (6.1)
We used the following OLS regression (equation 6.1) to test the influence of each
feedback treatment on each individual activity level. In the baseline treatment
no special feedback is given. As the number of orders is power-law distributed,
following Raban (2008) we use a logarithmic transformation of the Orders vari-
able. The regression results are depicted in Table 6.1. The model is dominated by
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(N=410) Newsletter Thanks Ranking Trading Number of Random
log(Orders) performance trades
Estimate 0.26c -0.01 -0.32 -0.22 -0.14 0.09
(t− stat.) (1.9) (-0.1) (-1.2) (-0.9) (-0.6) (0.4)
Table 6.1: Trading activity and feedback mechanisms: The superscript ’c’ denotes signif-
icance at the 10% level.
the newsletter effect. Participants receiving the newsletter submit significantly
more orders. As all feedback treatments show no significant effect, we conclude
that feedback mechanisms do not induce any additional motivation to contribute
in competitive market environments. It seems that different individual compet-
itiveness levels dominate any feedback effect.
6.4.3 Learning
As previously detailed, learning might take place on two levels; first by ac-
tively trading, participants might gain experience and hence improve over time.
Secondly, by observing their performance participants might realize their low-
ability and consequently leave the market. Using the number of past orders as a
proxy for experience we test the first idea of learning by doing. We run following
OLS regression:





NumOrderst,u denotes the number of orders a user u has submitted before the
specific order o. We add five indicator variables (Mi) to control for indicator ef-
fects and two variables for trading behavior. TDo indicates the trade direction
of the order, it is one if it is a buy and zero for a sell order. Inito is one if the
order is a trade-initializing order. We find the experience (numOrders) variable
positively correlated (estimate: 1.62; t− stat. : 3.51; p-value < 1%) with profits.
Testing if participants learn about their own ability, we assume that participants
are more likely to stop trading if their performance is below average. As men-
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tioned we implemented and displayed two ranking versions, one displaying
the overall portfolio value one aimed at showing the peer forecasting perfor-
mance. When correlating the two rankings we find that they differ substantially
(ρ : 0.11, p− value < 5%). In order to test the learning about ability model we use
performance data from the first round to predict activity in the second round.
Activeu,2 = i + β1 ∗ activeu,1 + β2 ∗MLu (6.3)
The Logit regression (equation 6.3) tests if a participant was active (submitted
at least one order) in the second round, dependent on being in the lower half
of the portfolio ranking and was getting the newsletter. We find no significant
effect for the overall portfolio ranking. However, if we recode the low-variable
to reflect the forecast performance based ranking, we find that the below aver-
age performing participants are less likely to continue trading (odds-ratio: -1.95;
χ2:20.23; p-value < 0.1%). A reason for the difference might lie in the presen-
tation, as the forecast-ranking is higher in the browsing menu structure on the
webpage. Combining these results, we conclude that participants gain experi-
ence over time and with increasing experience submit more profitable orders.
Turning to learning about ability we find that the forecast performance-based but
not the portfolio-based ranking predicts if participants stay active.
6.5 Conclusion
Internet communities offer the advantage of instant information exchange and
group decision that is not possible in a real-life. One important design aspect is
the incentive mechanism that fosters participation and contribution. We present
an incentives scheme well-suited to motivate participants contributing their in-
formation for longer time horizons. Investigating the level of participation, we
find that activity is mainly driven by a weekly newsletter which acts as a re-
minder. Assuming that classical feedback mechanisms would lead to different
participation levels, we find that the induced competitiveness of market envi-
ronments seem to superpose classical feedback mechanisms.
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Our semi-anonymous market enables naive and professional forecasters to test
their forecast ability compared to their peers. We show that participants gain
experience over time indicating that the active, engaging environment fosters
learning. Furthermore, we find that learning takes place as participants who
submitted more orders are more likely to submit an additional profitable order.
Testing if participants are able to learn about their forecasting ability, we find that
a specifically designed forecasting ranking provides the necessary feedback.

Chapter 7
Interface Design in Prediction
Markets
7.1 Introduction
ONE reason for market failure is the inherent complexity excluding non-sophisticated users. The Internet has increased the number of complex
(e.g. Energy, P2P resource sharing) markets dramatically. As more and more
non-sophisticated users have to interact with complex markets, the question
arises how to provide suitable interfaces for such users. Market complexity can
be reduced by adopting the market rules or by simplifying the user interface.
Just recently researchers started to address this topic and identified the need to
merge market and interface design. More radically Seuken et al. (2010) proposed
to hide most market complexities from the user. They call the this approach Hid-
den Market Design. The main idea is to hide or reduce market complexities while
maintaining economic efficiency. One way to accomplish that is to simplify the
market interface. However, it remains unclear how simplified trading interfaces
affect market efficiency and individual trading decisions. Hence it is completely
unclear how to actively design market interfaces.
A reason why non-sophisticated users might have difficulties interacting with
such markets is the amount of information they have to cope with. A common
belief about decision making is that the more information available the better
are our decisions. In contrast to that intuitive belief, Human Computer Inter-
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action (HCI) research has repeatedly shown that too much information leads
to cognitive overload resulting in decreased decision performance (Eppler and
Mengis, 2004; Chervany and Dickson, 1974). As a consequence we rely on in-
formation systems to filter, aggregate and present this information in a manner
that supports the decision making process. Thus far there are no guidelines on
what information is needed to support trading decisions. In order to create such
guidelines, one needs to understand which information elements support and
which elements hinder the individual trading process. Moreover, as individuals
have different informational needs and vary in experience, it seems fruitful to
develop customized market interfaces.
We propose to analyze user actions in a repeated market environment where
information processing plays a key role. Within the EIX field experiment with
more than 1,200 participants and over 65,000 single decisions we study the im-
pact of information elements on trading behavior and performance.
In our prediction market for economic variables, participants have two ways to
change their trading interface. First they are able to customize the default in-
terface and second they can switch to a trading wizard. This provides us with
datasets for two experiments.
In the first experiment traders can select up to seven information elements to
adopt the interface to their informational needs. Surprisingly, we show that on
average an increase in information degrades trading performance. An expla-
nation for this effect may lie in cognitive theory. Displaying more information
increases the participants’ cognitive load and hence may reduce decision accu-
racy and confidence. We are able to distinguish between trading behavior and
performance and thereby provide insight into the interplay between interface,
information and decision-making. Additionally, we can track the influence of
individual information elements and identify those that improve or decrease
trading performance. Focusing on the anchoring bias we link behavioral as-
pects of the market participants to the quality of their decisions. Creating a link
between behavioral aspects of the participants and quality is important in that
the quality of the predictive power is directly negatively affected if participants
make systematically biased decisions.
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In the second experiment participants can individually choose between two
trading interface types. One interface type is a standard trading interface,
whereas the other hides most market complexities. Recording through which
interface an order is submitted allows us to link trading performance and in-
terface type. Evaluating the hidden market design paradigm from an individ-
ual perspective, we find that alternative trading interfaces change participants’
behavior. Using the trading wizards traders are more likely to submit market
orders and submit orders with smaller sizes. Furthermore, and against naive
intuition, we find that orders submitted through a simplified interface are more
likely to be profitable compared to orders which are submitted through the de-
fault trading interface.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: the second section
presents a review of related work in the market interface domain. Additionally
a short overview of the economic influence on decision behavior is given. The
third section details the field experiment setting and the framing of the partic-
ipants’ trading process. The subsequent section first presents some descriptive
data and then introduces the evaluation methodology. Specifically, we use mar-
ket measures to separately analyze trading performance and trading behavior.
In section five we link the interface types to trading outcome and interpret the
results. Finally section six concludes this chapter.
7.2 Related Work
7.2.1 Market Interface Design
A fundamental assumption of many market designers is that participants are so-
phisticated and act rational. Hence, participants are able to express their expec-
tations as bids and understand the underlying implications. As a consequence,
designers have developed mechanisms that are theoretically efficient if partici-
pants are perfectly rational (Maskin, 2008). Assuming a perfect rational agent;
designing the market interface is just a means of presenting the mechanism.
In this line of reasoning oftentimes the market interface is used to present as
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much information as possible to support the trading process. However, it is well
known that individuals are bounded rational and might not able to cognitively
handle all available information (Simon, 1997). This raises the question of which
information supports trading decision and which information distracts.
7.2.2 Hidden Market Design
Challenged by the rise of complex markets (e.g. Energy, P2P resource sharing)
in which non-sophisticated users find it hard to interact, Seuken et al. proposed
the idea of Hidden Market Design. “The Hidden Market Design challenge is to find
new techniques and approaches towards designing and building hidden markets for non-
sophisticated users. The primary goal [..] is to find the right trade-off between hiding or
reducing some of the market complexities while maximizing economic efficiency attained
in equilibrium.” (Seuken et al., 2010). Hence, the goal is to lower the entrance
barriers (e.g. market complexities) for non-sophisticated users to participate in
markets. The simplification can be achieved by either changing the user inter-
face or adapting the market rules. Following the idea they design a market-
based P2P backup application (Seuken et al., 2010). In the paper they address
both aspects, the user interface eliciting participants’ preferences and the market
rules, standardizing the market interaction. However, it remains unclear how
the simplified trading interface affects market efficiency and individual trading
decisions. The first step is a better understanding of which information elements
support and which elements hinder the individual trading process. Moreover, as
individuals have different informational needs and cognitive capacity, it seems
fruitful to develop customized market interfaces.
7.2.3 User Behavior in Trading Environments
As the literature on interface design in financial markets is sparse, we mostly
rely on findings from related fields. Kauffman and Diamond (1990) highlight
the importance of research on behavioral decision making and information pre-
sentation effects. They examine how behavioral effects may become operative
in screen-based securities and foreign exchange trading activities, where users
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can choose among information presentation formats which support trader de-
cision making. They present a model to identify where and how information,
heuristics and biases might effect decision making in the trading environment.
Besides this theoretical model there exists, to our knowledge, no work linking
the decision making in continuous markets to the trading interface.
In the domains of decision support systems and online shopping environments
the influence of the interface on decision behavior has been repeatedly demon-
strated. Kleinmuntz and Schkade (1993) find that information displays influence
decision processes by facilitating some decision strategies while hindering oth-
ers. Decision makers balance the desire to maximize accuracy against the desire
to minimize effort. Kleinmuntz and Schkade (1993) further separate character-
istics of information displays into: (i) the form of individual items (numerical,
verbal or pictorial), (ii) the organization into meaningful structures (groups, hi-
erarchies or patterns) and (iii) the sequence (the order in which information el-
ement appears). In a follow-up study they show that organization strongly in-
fluences information acquisition while form influences information combination
and evaluation. The sequence had only a limited effect on information acquisi-
tion (Schkade and Kleinmuntz, 1994). Investigating the relationship between
problem representation and task type in information acquisition, Vessey (1991)
develops the cognitive fit theory. The theory proposes that the correspondence
between task and information presentation leads to superior task performance
for individual users. In several studies, cognitive fit theory has provided an ex-
planation for performance differences among users across different presentation
formats such as tables, graphs, and schematic faces (Vessey, 1994; Vessey and
Galletta, 1991). Additionally, they show that increasing interface flexibility in-
stead of an informed choice of of display format may be harmful rather than
helpful to the problem solver. Similarly Speier and Morris (2003) compare the
use of visual and text-based interfaces for low and high complexity tasks. They
find that in low complexity environments participants perform better using text-
based query tools. However, in the high complexity environments participants
perform better with visual support. Turning to the optimal pool of available
information in decision support systems, empirical work has shown that users
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can handle only a certain amount of data. Malhotra (1982) concludes that indi-
viduals cannot optimally handle more than ten information items or attributes
simultaneously. Testing decision accuracy Streufert et al. (1967) show that as in-
formation load increases, decision making first increases, reaches an optimum
(information load ten) and then decreases. Finally, in an interactive home shop-
ping simulation Ariely (2000) tested how the participants’ control over informa-
tion influences their utilization of this information. He compared four settings;
if information control was high-low and the task complexity was high-low. He
finds that increased control over information leads to better performance in tasks
with low complexity and lower performance in the high complexity setting. He
reasoned that for participants in the low complexity setting, when demand on
processing resources is low, more information is beneficial. In complex situations
however the information is detrimental to performance due to the additional
burden of selecting the right information (Ariely, 2000). He concludes that when
cognitive load is high (when the task is novel or difficult) high information con-
trol can be harmful.
To summarize previous work, the amount and control of information, as well as
the information representation does influence user behavior. On the one hand
information control improves performance by improving the fit between actions
and outcomes. On the other hand in terms of cost (disadvantages), information
control requires the user to invest processing resources in managing the infor-
mation amount and flow. As a conclusion, information control has both positive
and negative effects on performance. The two tasks of processing and managing
information are related and codependent. Finally, one must note that previous
work has mainly investigated the topic in laboratory settings. We analyze deci-
sion behavior in a field experiment setting, namely a prediction market.
Anchoring
As in many domains of human judgment and decision-making, market partici-
pants rely on judgmental heuristics and mental shortcuts that turn complex de-
cisions into simple judgment tasks. One of these heuristics or biases is the an-
choring effect. It refers to the fact that a previously mentioned random number
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influences the forecasting judgment (Camerer and Lowenstein, 2003). Kahne-
man and Tversky (1979) show that even when decision makers are anchored to
an arbitrary number such as their social security number a following decision is
influenced by this random number.
On one hand market interfaces provide public information to form a belief. On
the other hand it offers the possibility to anchor the decision to some (mis-
leading) value. Therefore, another question is whether the interface in gen-
eral influences decision behavior. But although prices may have no memory,
investors do. In fact, it has been demonstrated that past stock prices do influ-
ence forecasts of stock prices (De Bondt, 1993). Furthermore, Mussweiler and
Schneller (2003) studied how charts depicting past stock prices influence invest-
ing decisions. They find that market participants buy more and sell less when
the critical chart is characterized by a salient high rather than by a low. One find-
ing from laboratory experiments is that individuals with low cognitive abilities
tend to be significantly more affected by behavioral biases (Hoppe and Kusterer,
2010).
Influence on Market Efficiency
Psychologists have demonstrated a variety of systematic departures from “ra-
tional” decision making by individuals. These lead to substantial information
processing or judgment biases and colored expectations (Camerer and Lowen-
stein, 2003; Oechssler et al., 2009). Despite the evidence for persisting biases,
market prices have not been distorted (Gil and Levitt, 2007; Forsythe et al., 1999;
Luckner, 2007). When the bias is publicly known markets provide an incentive to
de-bias (Gruca and Berg, 2007). As long as there are enough rational traders ac-
tively compensating the bias, price accuracy is not affected. Cowgill et al. (2009)
report that pricing biases declined over the sample period and their market per-
formed better as collective trading experience increased. As in any setting where
biased agents are involved, following Hahn and Tetlock (2005) the real question
is whether markets are more robust to the participation of irrational agents than
other mechanisms. So far there is no definite answer to this question.
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7.3 Setting and Research Question
7.3.1 Experimental Setting
In order to test the effect of different (customizable) trading interfaces on trading
behavior and performance we use data from the EIX prediction market for eco-
nomic variables. The EIX provides three trading interfaces which are displayed
in Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1: Three trading interfaces: Two wizards (left), default customizable trading
interface (right)
Customizable Trading Interface
The default trading interface is displayed on the right side in Figure 7.1. Par-
ticipants have convenient access to the order book (I1) with 10 levels of visible
order book depth, the price chart (I2), the account information (I3) and market
information (I4) such as the last trading day. As additional information the Han-
delsblatt provides access to an up-to-date economic news-stream (5) and finally
the indicator’s last years performance is displayed (I6). In the second round, we
added a panel to display a list of previous orders (I7).
Participants are able to customize their trading interface individually. By click-
ing the small arrows the seven information panels open and close. In the default
setting, only the trading mask and the seven headlines are visible. After each
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submitted order the chosen interface is saved per user. On user return the sys-
tem opens the previously used interface elements on default. The advantage is
twofold; first users have a convenient option to customize their trading experi-
ence, secondly we can assess which self-selected information pieces have influ-
enced the participants’ decision processes. Additionally we did not have to form
groups with different interfaces and assign users to certain groups. This setting
would possibly create an unfair experience.
Trading Wizards
Additionally to the default trading interface, participants have the choice to
switch to a trading wizard guiding their trading decisions. In order to test for the
interface influence on trading performance we designed two different wizards
displayed in Figure 7.1 on the left hand side, marked with Wizard1 and Wizard2.
Participants are randomly assigned in one of two groups with access to one of
the two different trading wizards. Interface Wizard1 is designed as a three step
trading wizard, with three (green) boxes appearing in order. In the first step
participants indicate if they believe the prediction to be higher or lower than the
current market forecast. In the second step they are asked about their confidence
in their prediction. The third box just displays the generated order. Interface
Wizard2 simply asks the participant to indicate a prediction interval with two
handles. On the right hand side an order is automatically generated depending
on the current orderbook and the distance between lowest and highest indicated
prediction value. The interface is similar to and was inspired by the Yoopick
interface (Goel et al., 2008). It is noteworthy that both wizards provide far less
information than the default interface. In terms of Seuken et al. (2010) interface
type Wizard1 can be considered as a weakly hidden market interface, whereas
type Wizard2 hides the market completely .
7.3.2 Research Model
In order to answer the question on how to design (web-based) trading inter-
faces we have to deeply understand if and how different interfaces influence
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trading behavior and performance. More specifically, we need to analyze how
participants search for information and how they incorporate this information
in their trading process. Are they able to optimally utilized all available infor-
mation? To give indications for these research questions we run two experi-
Figure 7.2: Market interfaces: Experiment overview
ments. As previously described, market participants can access the market via
two trading venues. The default trading interface is fully customizable whereas
the alternative trading venues (trading wizards) aim at supporting trading deci-
sions. Following the experimental setup (see Figure 7.2), we start by analyzing
how participants customize their interface and how this correlates with trading
behavior and performance. In the second experiment we analyze how hiding
certain market features affects participant performance. Hence, we evaluate the
Hidden Market Design paradigm.
From an abstract perspective, both experiments and their evaluation follow the
research model depicted in Figure 7.3. First traders decide to use a certain inter-
face or customize their interface a certain way (H1). Correlated with this choice
is their trading behavior. It seems likely that when using hidden market interface,
certain market behavior is supported like submitting price taking orders. This
will be analyzed in a second step (H2). Finally and most importantly by control-
ling for trading behavior we analyze how the resulting trading performance is
influenced by different trading interfaces (H3). Generally as the research model
depicts, we have to control for market micro-structure effects such as different
contracts. The following two sections detail our research hypotheses for both
experiment separately.
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Figure 7.3: Research model
Customizing Market Interfaces
In the first step we analyze how participants individually customize their user
interface. From another perspective we analyze which information different par-
ticipants regard as useful. On one hand all information might help the user to
trade better and improve her decisions. On the other hand no interface panel
can be regarded as indispensable in order to trade. Therefore, we have first to
analyze which interface elements are regarded worth considering in the trading
process. Following Ariely (2000) we assume that participants choose different
information elements as they try to adapt the interface to their informational
needs. We expect users who are familiar with market environments to use more
information elements. Users with no market experience might feel confused by
too much data and hence reduce the interface to the simple basics.
E1-H1) Users with a high market knowledge self-assessment use more information
elements.
In a second step (H2) we present how the self-chosen interface influences the
participants’ trading behavior. As all traders have the same start portfolio, the
size of a trade is a proxy for the trader’s confidence perception. Assuming that
participants using more information (a high number of open information ele-
ments) are more confident about how to trade, it seems reasonable that the re-
sulting order size is on average higher. Another individual market behavior is
how participants submit their orders. We distinguish between market orders
and limit orders. Market orders trade instantaneously against a standing limit
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order. Therefore, traders submitting market orders pay the effective spread in
order to execute directly knowing that the order will be executed. Less con-
fident traders want to keep the effective spread and submit limit orders. We
assume that traders using more information are more confident about their de-
cisions and submit market orders. Another question is whether the interface in
general influences trading behavior. On one hand the interface provides public
information to form a belief; on the other hand it offers the possibility to anchor
the decision to some (misleading) value. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) show
that even when decision makers are anchored to an arbitrary number such as
their social security number a following decision is influenced by this random
number. As a consequence we assume to find that when the historic value in-
terface is open it induces an anchor effect. Accordingly, the hypotheses for the
participants’ trading behavior (H2) are:
E1-H2a)Participants with a high number of open information elements are more
likely to submit orders with above average quantity.
E1-H2b)The higher the number of open information interfaces the higher the chance
that participants submit market orders.
E1-H2c)When the historic value interface (I6) is open, the difference between the
last historic value and the submitted limit price is lower.
Finally and most importantly, we analyze how the self-chosen interface influ-
ences the participants’ trading performance (H3). The intuitive assumption is
the more information the better the decision accuracy. Hence a higher number of
open information elements lead to a better trading performance. As presented,
previous work suggests that decision performance might suffer if the informa-
tion load is too high or the control of information distracts from the problem
solution Malhotra (1982). Therefore, the alternative hypothesis is that too much
information reduces decision accuracy.
E1-H3a)The more information elements are open, the better the participants’ deci-
sion accuracy.
E1-H3b)The more information elements are open, the lower the participants’ deci-
sion accuracy.
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In combination, the three steps provide a first recognition of a market’s interface
impact on trader behavior. Moreover, they provide insight how a market’s inter-
face affect individual trading behavior and subsequently trading performance.
Hidden Market Design
We expect users who are familiar with market environments to use the default
interface with more information. Users with no market experience might feel
confused by too much data and might switch to a trading supporting interface.
In the first step (H1) we present how the self-chosen interface influences the
participants’ trading behavior. As all traders have the same start portfolio the
size of a trade is a proxy for the trader’s confidence perception. Assuming that
participants using the wizards are less confident about how to trade, it seems
reasonable that the resulting order size is on average lower.
As in the previous section detailed another individual market behavior is how
participants submit their orders. If they submit market orders they are confident
about their forecast, if they submit limit orders they want to keep the realized
spread. As the wizards do not display the current orderbook, it is reasonable to
assume that wizard users are more likely to submit market orders. As a conse-
quence the hypotheses for participants trading behavior (H1) are:
E2-H1a)Orders which are submitted through a trading wizard are smaller in size
on average.
E2-H1b)Using the trading wizard increases the chance that participants submit
market orders.
Finally and most importantly, we analyze how the self-chosen interface influ-
ences the participants’ trading performance (H2). As more information is dis-
played in the default trading interface an intuitive assumption is to expect a bet-
ter trading performance through the default interface. However an alternative
perspective from decision theory is, that the more information, the worse the
performance (Malhotra, 1982). Thus the hypotheses for the interface influence
on trading performance (H2) are:
E2-H2a)Using a trading wizard improves the participants’ trading performance.
E2-H2aa)Using a trading wizard impairs the participants’ trading performance.
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In combination the two steps provide a first empirical analysis of the hidden
market design paradigm. Moreover, they provide insight how a market’s inter-
face effect individual trading behavior and subsequently trading performance.
7.4 Results
The following section first presents some descriptive market statistics and then
details a regression framework measuring the effect of different trading inter-
faces on trading behavior and performance.
7.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
The following data includes the timespan from 30th October 2009 till 31st of Oc-
tober 2011. In total 1,235 participants registered at the EIX market, of those 824
submitted at least one order. We discard all stocks with less than 50 transac-
tions. Altogether participants submitted 79,334 orders resulting in 34,028 exe-
cuted transactions. Previous work showed that the market-generated forecasts
performed well in comparison to the “Bloomberg”- survey forecasts, the indus-
try standard (See chapter 4 and Teschner et al. (2011)).
For every order we record the open interfaces elements (I1-I7, see Figure 3.3). In
the following an interface variable is 1 when the element is open otherwise it is
0. Moreover we record through which trading venue (wizard one, wizard two
or default) the order was submitted. In the following an interface variable is 1
when the trading venue is used otherwise it is 0, e.g. variable W1 is 1 if the al-
ternative trading screen Wizard1 is used (see Figure 3.3). In our field experiment
we asked participants to self-assess their market-knowledge. According to their
rating, we cluster the participants into two groups; the good (MK=1) and the not
good (MK=0) market knowledge groups. In the first group are 499 participants
and 763 participants rated their knowledge as not good.
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7.4.2 Methodology
Analyzing Trading Behavior
As described in the last section to measure the participant’s decision confidence
we use two proxies. The order size and how traders submit their bids. In order
to capture how predictor variables correlate with the submitted quantity we use
OLS regressions.




We relate the quantity of a specific order to n predictor variables (e.g. to the num-
ber of open interfaces.) As the different indicators exhibit different historic vari-
ances, e.g. exports are much more volatile than inflation, we control by adding
the market dummy variables MCi. Similarly to control for the self-assessed mar-
ket knowledge or other trader behavior we add m behavior control dummies.
The control variables are included in all presented regressions.
For the second proxy we look at how users submit their offers. For an executed
trade there are only two possibilities; either an order is a limit order or it is mar-
ket order. The market order is initializing a trade against a standing limit order.
As this is a binary outcome we use a binomial logistic regression. If a trade is ini-
tializing, which means it is market making, the dependent variable is 1 otherwise
it is 0. Equation (7.2) exemplifies this. The regression measures the influence of
predictor variables on the probability whether a trade is initializing or passive.





As discussed in Chapter 2, we can ex-post measure the information content of
each order. Moreover, the Scoreoi (equation 2.8) rates an order as profitable or
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unprofitable. This allows us to capture the interface effect on an order per order
basis.
For the profitability measures we use two regressions to capture the effects.
First we measure the influence of predictor variables on the probability whether
a trade is profitable or not.




The dependent variable is the score defined in equation 2.8 which is 1 for a profit
and 0 for a loss. As before we control for different underlying uncertainties in the
market categories and different trading behavior by adding dummy variables.
Finally, we use OLS-regressions to estimate the effect on the resulting profit per
order.




As we basically use a panel data set (e.g., the EIX data set contains observations
on multiple indicators from different individuals over time) OLS standard errors
might be biased. Hence, besides controlling for indicators, we use participant
clustered standard errors. More precisely, we are using Rogers (1994)-standard
errors, which are White (1980, 1984)-standard errors adjusted to account for the
possible correlation within a cluster. Hence, these are also called Rogers stan-
dard errors in the finance literature. In order to separate effects not only between
participants but also within, we run the previously described regressions also as
fixed effects models. This is identical to adding N-1 dummy variables, where N
is the number of participants in the sample.
Following the experiment sequence, we first analyze how customizing trading
interfaces affects trader behavior. We then compare trading between the three
interfaces used.
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7.4.3 Customizing the Trading Interface
We start by showing that participants choose different information elements to
support their trading. Moreover, individual behavior differs depending on the
interface elements implemented. Controlling for different trading behavior we
find that a market participants using a lower number of open interfaces are
more likely to submit profitable orders. Table 7.1 shows how market knowl-
I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 I7
Good 95% 38% 40% 48% 16% 43% 53%
Not Good 89% 33% 42% 44% 20% 40% 53%
Difference 6a 5a -2a 4a -4a 3a 0
(t-Stat.) (30.8) (9.9) (-4.1) (11.2) (-16.7) (6.9) (0.8)
Table 7.1: Market knowledge self-assessment and interface customization. The table
shows the interface usage (I1-I7) separately for the two user groups. (e.g. In 95% of all
trades a trader with good market knowledge, the orderbook (I1) is open.) We test for
the difference between the two groups with a simple t-test. The superscript ’a’ denotes
significance at the 0.1% level.
edge self-assessment and interface choice is related. Participants with a good
self-assessed market knowledge use the orderbook (I1), the price chart (I2), the
market (I4) and the historic values (I6) more often than the other participants.
From another perspective, participants with a not good self-assessment open
their account (I3) and the news (I5) more often. Turning to the first hypoth-
esis we find that the number of open interfaces on average is higher (3.04 vs
2.89; t− stat. : 8.9; p− value < 0.1%) for users with good market knowledge self-
assessment. As a consequence we acept E1-H1.
7.4.4 Customized Interface and Trading Behavior
A common proxy for confidence in a trading environments is the submitted
quantity. We suspected that participants with a high number of open informa-
tion elements are more confident about their trading decision and thus submit
orders with a higher quantity. As presented in Table 7.2, Model A; the opposite
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is the case; the higher the number of open interfaces the lower the submitted
quantity. Accordingly we reject E1-H2a.
Trading Behavior Trading Performance
Quantity Order-type Profit Score
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
(t-Stat.) (χ-Square) (t-Stat.) (χ-Square)
Model A Model B Model C Model D
Dependent Quantityo Inito Pro f ito Scoreo
variable
Number of -84.26a -0.06a 1291.92 -0.04a
Interfaces (-12.2) (215.4) (0.8) (78.6)
Market -5.36 -0.29a -590.06 0.08a
Knowledge (-0.2) (213.4) (-0.1) (17.9)
Table 7.2: The influence of the number of open interfaces. The Model A gives the
values for the OLS Quantity regression (equation 7.1). The estimates show that if the
number of interfaces is increased (e.g. from 2 to 3) the submitted quantity per order
is reduced by 84. As Model B and D are Logit-regressions, the interpretation of the
estimates is different. The estimates represent the change in the log odds of the outcome
for a one unit increase in the predictor variable. (The chance that an order is a market
order or that it is profitable is reduced with number of open interface elements.) The
superscript ’a’ denotes significance at the 0.1%, ’b’ at the 1% level.
Investigating further which interface elements drive the quantity decision we
use equation 7.2, regressing the submitted quantity on individual information
elements. Table 7.3, Model A, shows the results. The orderbook, the price chart,
account information and the previous order elements have an increasing effect.
We assumed that participants with more information would be more confi-
dent and hence submit more market orders. As the estimates in in Table 7.2,
Model B; show this is not the case. The higher the number of open information
interfaces the lower the chance that participants submit market orders. We reject
E1-H2b and conclude that a high number of open interfaces results in a higher
chance that participants submit limit orders. Following our arguement, one can
interpret that participants with a higher number of interfaces act more cautious
and submit limit orders, in order to keep the possible realized spread. Looking
at how individual interfaces influence the order-type; Table 7.3, Model B, shows
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that only an open news interface (I5) correlates with a higher chance of submit-
ting market orders. The market information element (I4) renders the participants
more cautious.
Taking the two proxies together, we conclude that trading confidence is reduced
the more information the participants use. Alternatively one might argue that
uncertain participants, with low confidence, use more information elements.
Our last behavioral hypothesis states that the historic value interface (I6) induces
an anchoring bias, as participants orient their trading decision on an easy to un-
derstand and accessible variable. This simple forecast heuristic does not imply
that the decision is necessarily bad. As Osterloh (2008) shows, the naive fore-
cast1 is often as good as the expert prediction for economic indicators.
In order to analyze whether participants exhibit an anchor bias we use the fol-
lowing OLS regression.





with ∆o,i = |Limitpricei,o − Historic Valuei| (7.6)
On the left hand side is the distance between submitted limit price and the last
historic value which is displayed in the interface element I6. Additionally we
control for the market knowledge and the risk factors from the different mar-
kets. If participants exhibit an anchor bias the last historic value is used as an
orientation and hence the distance ∆o,i should be reduced. Table 7.4 depicts that
the distance between historic value and limit price is significantly reduced if the
corresponding interface (I6) is open. We follow that the display induces an an-
chor effect and accept E1-H2c. Hence, taking these three results together, we find
that the trading interface at least partly influences how participants submit their
orders.
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7.4.5 Customized Interface and Trading Performance
We suggested two alternative hypothesis regarding the interface influence on
decision accuracy. One might intuitively suspect that a higher number of in-
formation panels correlates with better trading decisions. Turning to Table 7.2,
Model C; reveals that the chance of submitting a profitable order is lower with
an increasing number of information panels. We thus reject hypothesis E1-H3a
and accept E1-H3aa. Interestingly looking at the interface elements supporting
successful trading, it turns out that the price chart and the previous order ele-
ment have a positive effect (Table 7.5). Moreover, the market element (I4) has a
negative effect. A possible explanation for this result might be that certain in-
formation provided by the system may not actually help in the decision making
process. When designing the interface the goal was to support the participants
to make good forecasts and consequently make good decisions. As the really
informative interface elements can only be identified ex-post this result would
suggest to rework the interface design and reduce the number of information
elements to a minimum.
7.4.6 Interface Type and Trading Performance
Turning to the second experiment we will evaluate in this section how two alter-
native interfaces support non-sophisticated traders participating in a (complex)
prediction market. We show how individual behavior differs depending on the
interface used. Controlling for trading behavior, we find that market participants
using a trading wizard are more likely to submit profitable orders. Following
the presented research model we start by analyzing how trader behavior differs
if participants use certain interfaces.
A common proxy for confidence in a trading environment is the submitted quan-
tity. We assumed that participants using the wizards are less confident about
trading, and hence the resulting order size is lower on average. We test these
1using the previous value as a predictor
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hypothesis using following OLS regressions.





In Table 7.6 the results for regression 7.7 (Model A and B) are depicted. Model
B includes participant fixed effects. Hence, the estimate show the effect within
individual participants. Participants using the wizards submit orders with a
lower quantity of at least -569 per order on average. Thus, we can accept hy-
pothesis E2-H1a. Separating the effect for certain wizard types, we see that the









For the second proxy we look at how users submit their offers. Orders are either
liquidity taking or liquidity providing. We code liquidity taking (initializing)
orders with Init. = 1. Equation (7.8) measures the influence of the interfaces
on the probability whether a trade is initializing or passive. As this is a binary
outcome we use a binomial logistic regression. We assumed that participants
using the wizard do not see the orderbook and hence are more likely to submit
market orders. As the estimates in in Table 7.6, Model C and D; show this is the
case. Accordingly we accept E2-H1b. Again looking at the particular influence
of each interface we find that the results are stronger for the wizard type W2. As
a conclusion, we find that participant behavior changes when using alternative
trading interfaces.
We suggested two alternative hypotheses regarding the interface influence on
trading performance. One might intuitively suspect that more information on
the default trading interface leads to better trading decisions. In that sense a
naive assumption is that the participants using the default trading interface are
more likely to submit profitable orders. To measure the effect on trading perfor-
mance we adapt equations (7.8) the following way; we exchange the dependent
variable log πInitπTrade by log
πScore
πTrade
. The Score of an order rates if the order moves the
price in right direction. However, we also want to know if the profit per order is
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increased. Hence we additionally run OLS regressions on the profit per order.





The results are depicted in Table 7.7. As Model C and D are Logit-regressions,
the estimates represent the change in the log odds of the outcome for a one unit
increase in the predictor variable. In the random effects model (C) we find no
difference between using either one of the wizard or the default trading inter-
face. However, turning to the fixed effects model (D), we find a -within subject-
effect. Participants using the second wizard are more likely to submit profitable
orders. For the first wizard we find no difference compared to the standard in-
terface. The Models A and B in Table 7.7 present the estimates for equation 7.9.
The results show that participants using the second wizard gain a higher profit
(5,334 currency units). Participants using the first wizard loose money compared
to using the standard market interface. In the fixed effects model (B) the direc-
tion still holds. However, the estimates are not significant.
Taking the results together, we conclude that alternative trading interfaces can
help improving trading performance. We thus reject hypothesis E2-H2aa and
accept E2-H2a. A possible explanation for this result might be that certain in-
formation provided by the system may not actually help but impair the trad-
ing decision process. It seems that the results are stronger for interface W2 the
strongly hidden market interface. We argue that one has to be careful designing
such interfaces. However, as the interfaces are merely a first attempt to design
simplified interfaces, there is a reason to believe that there is plenty of room for
future improvement.
7.5 Conclusion
Various allocation problems call for market based solutions. However, market
complexities impose high entry barriers for non-sophisticated users. One reason
is that in markets preferences are usually communicated through bids and offers
which requires participants to adapt to a different mental model. Recently re-
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searchers proposed the idea of hidden market design which merges the fields of
market design with user interface design in order to make complex markets ac-
cessible to a broader audience. As more trading decisions are facilitated through
(web-based) “trading support systems” one of the most urging questions is how
to design such interfaces. Moreover, it is important to design such interfaces
without reducing market efficiency and individual trading performance.
7.5.1 Market Interface Design
In our field experiment participants trade in a complex prediction market which
closely reassembles trading in financial markets. As the outcome of events in
prediction markets is finally known, we can ex-post measure the participants’
trading performance. In our market setting participants can individually cus-
tomize their interface. We show that participants choose different information
elements depending on their self-rated market knowledge. Apparently market
participants try to fit the interface to their individual problem representation. Yet
the individual motivation of the interface choice remains unclear.
We show that more information does not improve decision making but rather
leads to decreasing trading performance. From the results presented, one might
follow that information accessible on interfaces does not help forecasting eco-
nomic variables and hence the participants’ decision-making. Another interpre-
tation, which is in line with previous work, may be found in cognitive theory.
Too much information increases the participants’ cognitive load and hence may
reduce decision accuracy and confidence. Thus a high number of interface ele-
ments increases complexity and distracts from good decision making. As par-
ticipants are able to customize their interface they seem unaware of the negative
influence of the interface on their decisions. As a consequence market design-
ers should not only limit the amount of presented information but also make a
validated guess about which information is useful. Due to the close relation to
decision processes this paper helps to understanding the impact of decision sup-
port system interfaces on decision-making in general. From previous work it is
known that the amount and control of information, as well as the information
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representation does influence user behaviour. On one hand information con-
trol improves performance by improving the fit between actions and outcomes.
On the other hand information control requires the user to invest processing re-
sources in managing the information amount and flow. Therefore, information
control has both positive and negative effects on performance. Previous work
has mainly investigated the topic in laboratory settings. We analyzed decision
behaviour in a field experiment setting. This work also provides insight into the
interplay between interface, information and trading behavior. Furthermore, we
hope this work is a good starting point for practitioners and researchers design-
ing markets and their interfaces.
7.5.2 Hidden Market Design
Despite the rise of complex markets, non-sophisticated users still find it hard to
interact with such markets. Evaluating the hidden market paradigm from an
individual perspective, we find that alternative trading interfaces change partic-
ipants’ behavior. Using the trading wizards, traders are more likely to submit
market orders and submit orders with smaller sizes. Against naive intuition,
we find that orders submitted through the strongly hidden market interface are
more likely to be profitable compared to orders submitted trough the default
trading interface. A reason for that may be found in cognitive theory. Mar-
ket complexity increases the participants’ cognitive load and hence may reduce
trading performance and confidence. As a result this work provides insight into
the interplay between market design, interface, and trading behavior. Specifi-
cally in the domain of financial markets it is the first work to show the influence
of the trading interface on trading behavior and performance.
































Table 7.3: The effect on trading behavior of customizing interfaces. Model A gives
the values for the interface-quantity regression. The estimates show that if a specific
interfaces is open; how the submitted quantity per order is affected (e.g. If the orderbook
(I2) is open the submitted quantity is increased by 297). As Model B is a Logit-regression
the interpretation of the estimates is different. The estimates represent the change in the
log odds of the outcome for a one unit increase in the predictor variable. (The chance
that an order is a market order and that is profitable is reduced/increased with a specific
interfaces being open.) The superscript ’a’ denotes significance at the 0.1%, ’b’ at the 1%
level.






Table 7.4: Anchor heuristic. The tables presents the results from equation 7.6. The esti-
mates show that if interface I6 is open, the difference between the submitted price and
the last historic value is reduced on average by 2.4 price points. As the average price of
stocks is around 120, the 2.4 make an economic impact (2 %). The superscript ’a’ denotes
significance at the 0.1% level.
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Profitability
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
(t-Stat.) (t-Stat.) (χ-Square) (χ-Square)
Model A Model B Model C Model D
fixed effects fixed effects
Dependent Pro f ito Pro f ito Scoreo Scoreo
variable
I1 -25299 3360 0.20
a -0.38b
(-1.4) (0.71) (7.42) (5.26)
I2 14829 14628
a -0.37 -0.37a
(1.25) (3.78) (93.54) (56.51)
I3 19921
b 19558a -0.08 0.15b
(2.14) (3.8) (1.97) (4.21)
I4 -9808 -10415
c -0.11c -0.03
(-1.21) (-2.03) (4.05) (0.20)
I5 -8001 -8208 0.01 0.14
c
(-0.48) (-1.63) (0.08) (5.25)
I6 -3110 -1540 0.04 -0.01(-0.6) (-0.39) (0.99) (0.04)
I7 10704 10793
b 0.11b -0.04
(1.25) (2.48) (5.56) (0.38)
MK 4683 - 0.20
a -
(0.47) (-) (32.85) (-)
Table 7.5: The effect of customizing interfaces on performance. For Model A and B
the estimates show that if an specific interface is open; how the resulting profit (in EIX
currency units) is affected. As Model C and D are Logit-regressions the interpretation
of the estimates is different. The estimates represent the change in the log odds of the
outcome for a one unit increase in the predictor variable. The chance that an order is
profitable is reduced/increased with a specific interfaces being open. The superscript
’a’ denotes significance at the 0.1%, ’b’ at the 1%, and ’c’ at the 5% level.
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Trading behavior
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
(t-Stat.) (t-Stat.) (χ-Square) (χ-Square)
Model A Model B Model C Model D
fixed effects fixed effects
Dependent Quantityo Quantityo Inito Inito
variable
W1 -569
a -514a 0.15b 0.17a
(-6.3) (-3.8) (3.2) (7.1)
W2 -761
a -763a 0.22a 0.22a
(-7) (-4.5) (6.2) (7.2)
Init. -152 -82
b - -
(-1.6) (-3.2) (-) (-)
TD. 130 198
a 0.02 0.04a
(1.3) (7.7) (1.1) (9.2)
Quantity - - 0 -0.01
b
(-) (-) (0) (3.2)
MK. -40 - -0.07 -(-0.2) (-) (1.5) (-)
Table 7.6: Influence of trading wizards on trading behavior. Model A gives the values
for the regression (7.7). The estimates show that if a trading wizard is used, the submit-
ted quantity per order is reduced by 569 for wizard one and 761 for wizard two. The
results hold when using a fixed effects model (Model B).
As Model C and D are Logit-regressions, the interpretation of the estimates is different.
The estimates represent the change in the log odds of the outcome if the predictor vari-
able is one. (The chance that an order is a market order is increased when participants
use either wizard.). Again the results hold when using a fixed effects model (Model D).
The superscript ’a’ denotes significance at the 0.1%, ’b’ at the 1% , ’c’ at the 1% level.
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Profitability
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
(t-Stat.) (t-Stat.) (χ-Square) (χ-Square)
Model A Model B Model C Model D
fixed effects fixed effects
Dependent Pro f ito Pro f ito Scoreo Scoreo
variable
W1 -3161.68
a -2894.11 -0.04 0.02
(-3.3) (-0.6) (0.2) (0.1)
W2 5334.65
a 5355.27 0.14 0.57a
(4.2) (0.9) (1.2) (8.9)
Init. -859.66 -540 -0.17
a -0.12a
(-1.0) (-0.6) (79.9) (32.5)
TD. -14278.10
a -13978.68a -0.70a -0.62a
(-7.7) (-16.6) (1441.2) (920.4)
Quantity -0.73 -0.69
a -0.01c -0.01a
(-0.7) (-4.5) (3.5) (10.0)
MK. 1511.67 - 0.17
a -
(1.5) (-) (69.6) (-)
Table 7.7: Influence of trading wizards on order profitability. As Model A and B are
Logit-regressions, the estimates represent the change in the log odds of the outcome for
a one unit increase in the predictor variable. (The chance that an order is profitable is
higher when participants use the second wizard.) The Models B and C present the esti-
mates for the OLS Profit regression (equation 7.9). The estimates show that participants
using the second wizard gain a higher profit (5.334). Participants using the first wizard
loose money compared to using the standard market interface. In the fixed effects model
(D) the direction still holds. However the estimates are not significant. The superscript





MACROECONOMIC forecasts are used extensively in industry and gov-ernment even though the historical accuracy and reliability is disputed
(Osterloh, 2008; Schuh, 2001; McNees, 1992). We developed and study a predic-
tion market specifically designed to forecast economic indicators such as GDP,
Ifo-index, inflation, investments, export and unemployment figures in Germany.
Analyzing the market’s forecast accuracy, we find that forecast performance im-
proves constantly over time and that generated forecasts perform well in com-
parison to the Bloomberg-survey forecasts, the industry standard.
The main goal of this work is to address the following five research questions:
• How to quantify prediction market performance?
• How to design a market to forecast macroeconomic indices?
• What is the effect of short-selling on market quality and forecast perfor-
mance?
• How do incentives and feedback mechanisms affect participation in predic-
tion markets?
• How do trading interfaces affect trading behavior and performance?
Given the results of this work, these can be briefly answered as follows.
Contribution 1: How to quantify prediction market performance? In the last
20 years over 150 articles on prediction markets were published (Tziralis and
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Tatsiopoulos, 2007). However no meta-analysis was conducted that analyzed
prediction markets accuracy for various types of problems and fields of applica-
tion. One reason is the lack of a unified, stringent methodology used to analyze
prediction market data. Although there are a some published guidelines (e.g.,
Plott and Chen, 2002; Luckner, 2008; Sripawatakul and Sutivong, 2010) on how to
design and implement a prediction market, no work has yet described and sum-
marized evaluation methodologies. Moreover, there is no general understanding
what defines prediction market quality. Up till now, prediction markets are of-
ten quantified solely through the correlation between predictions (derived from
prices) and event outcomes. Simple correlations ignore external effects such as
uncertainty underlying the event outcomes. Hence a prediction market eval-
uation based only on forecast precision hinders the understanding of the key
success factors.
We provide a methodology framework that places several prominent measures
of market quality into the context of internal design factors. Based on a de-
tailed literature review, the framework summarizes and applies finance, fore-
casting and prediction market literature. The proposed framework for predic-
tion market quality consists of the four sections: liquidity, information, activ-
ity, and forecast performance. The first two sections describe finance methods
such as spread estimates, price impact and probability of informed trading. The
last two sections are based on forecasting and prediction market literature with
a strong focus on relative forecast performance measurement. Using the EIX-
market dataset, we apply and evaluate all described methods.
This unified methodology framework enable us to address questions regarding
the effect of different market designs, the question if an increasing number of
traders is always beneficial and how the application domain affects forecast ac-
curacy. Moreover it provides the methodical foundation for the following re-
search questions.
Contribution 2: How to design a market to forecast macroeconomic indices?
We first summarized findings from previous markets in the domain of macroe-
conomic forecasting and detailed the known shortcomings of the currently used
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binary payout designs. We proposed a radically different approach using a lin-
ear payout function. The theoretical improvements are threefold: (i) the number
of traded stocks is reduced leading to higher liquidity in the traded stocks, (iii)
the “partition-dependence” bias can be avoided and (iii) information can be ag-
gregated continuously and over longer time horizons.
We then designed and implemented a prediction market to forecast macroeco-
nomic variables in Germany. The market acts as a mechanism not only to ag-
gregate dispersed information but also to aggregate individual forecasts. It does
so by incentivizing participation and rewards early, precise forecasts. Moreover,
the market-platform is yet alone in aggregating these forecasts continuously and
for a long time horizon. Turning to the market-generated forecasts, we find that
forecast accuracy improves constantly over time as the forecast error drops by
0.012 points per day. Comparing the market forecasts to the Bloomberg-survey
forecasts, we find that they perform equally well. However, the Bloomberg fore-
cast is only available 8 days before the data release whereas the the market pro-
vides as accurate forecasts 30 days in advance. Additionally we are able to show
that the market has three supplementary benefits. To begin with, we can show
that the market measures can be used to predict the forecast error. This might
enable us to enhance the market forecast by providing a measure for forecast
confidence. Secondly, market measures can be used to identify valuable user in-
put and forecast experts in near real-time. Detecting such input might possibly
enable us to improve the information aggregation mechanism and the forecast
performance of such systems. Finally, in line with previous work, forecasts can
be improved by 16.7 % when combining Bloomberg-survey and market gener-
ated forecasts.
Contribution 3: What is the effect of short-selling on market quality and fore-
cast performance? We first discuss how short selling can be implemented in
the EIX market. Using an event study approach we then document the positive
effect of short selling on market accuracy. After the introduction of short sell-
ing, forecast errors drop by -30.8 %. Finally, we find that spreads which are a
proxy for market uncertainty are lowered by -51.3 %. The results indicate that
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short selling in linear prediction markets is an essential characteristic to enable
high prediction accuracy. It remains unclear whether different short selling im-
plementations lead to different results.
Contribution 4: How do incentives and feedback mechanisms affect partici-
pation in prediction markets? We presented an incentive scheme well-suited
to motivate participants contributing their information for longer time horizons.
Investigating the level of participation, we find that activity is mainly driven by
a weekly newsletter which acts as a reminder. On days the newsletter is sent
out we measure an 62 % increased trading activity. Assuming that classical feed-
back mechanisms would lead to different participation levels, we find that the
induced competitiveness of market environments seem to superpose classical
feedback mechanisms.
Our semi-anonymous game enables naïve and professional forecasters to test
their forecast ability and compare it to their peers. We show that with every or-
der a trader submits, her average profit per order increases by 1.6 currency units.
This means that participants gain experience over time which indicates that the
active engaging environment fosters learning. Testing if participants are able to
learn their forecasting ability, we display a specifically designed forecast perfor-
mance ranking. We show that participants who are low performing receive the
necessary feedback and hence realize their low forecast ability.
Contribution 5: How do trading interfaces affect trading behavior and perfor-
mance? In the EIX market setting, participants can customize their interface
individually. We show that market participants try to fit the interface to their in-
dividual problem representation. Yet the individual motivation of the interface
choice remains unclear. We can further show that more information does not
improve decision making but rather leads to decreasing trading performance.
It seems that too much information increases the participants’ cognitive load
and hence reduces decision accuracy and confidence. As participants are able
to customize their interface they seem unaware of the negative influence of the
interface on their decisions. As a consequence market designers should not only
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limit the amount of presented information but also make a validated guess about
which information is useful.
Evaluating the hidden market paradigm from an individual perspective, we find
that alternative trading interfaces change participants’ behavior. Using the trad-
ing wizards, traders are more likely to submit market orders and submit or-
ders with smaller sizes. Against naïve intuition, we find that orders submitted
through the strongly hidden market interface are more likely to be profitable
compared to orders submitted trough the default trading interface. Even though
the wizard interface is mainly used by inexperienced participants the results
show that participants using the wizard gain a higher profit of 5,334 currency
units per order. As a result this work provides insights into the interplay be-
tween market design, interface, and trading behavior.
8.2 Complementary Research & Future Work
The following section presents some on-going and future work which mainly
builds upon the thesis results.
A prediction market meta-study The studies available to date show high ac-
curacy of prediction markets for various fields of application. However, some
studies only report absolute accuracy or compare the results to benchmarks like
polls or betting odds. To gain a better understanding of what drives market accu-
racy as well as market quality it seems promising to combine data from various
field experiments. Since the emergence of the field, no meta-analysis was con-
ducted that analyzed prediction markets accuracy for various types of problems
and fields of application. This is also partly due to a lack of a common method-
ology basis. Hence, the presented prediction market quality framework enables
us to use a unified methodology. A meta-study could tackle questions regard-
ing the effect of different market designs, the question if an increasing number
of traders is always beneficial and how the application domain affects forecast
accuracy. Related to this question is, how traders’ personality traits influence
their decision making and if pre-selecting certain traders could improve market
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accuracy.
Analyzing trader behavior and personality traits Psychologists have demon-
strated a variety of systematic departures from rational decision making by in-
dividuals. These lead to substantial information processing or judgment biases
and colored expectations (Forsythe et al., 1999). Markets suffer from biases as
well and it is an ongoing debate to which extent they affect market efficiency
(Arrow et al., 2008). Objectively irrelevant (Huber et al., 2008) and selectively
presented information (Dittrich et al., 2005) influence individual trading behav-
ior. A promising approach to describe and explain financial decision making
may be the explicit consideration of psychological factors. In particular heuris-
tics and biases need to be integrated. Future work should link behavioral aspects
of the market participants and the quality of their decisions. Creating a link be-
tween behavioral aspects of the participants and quality is important in that the
quality of the predictive power might be directly negatively affected if partici-
pants make systematically biased decisions. This is relatively well known, but
still not well understood or studied, hypothesis of the behavioral finance litera-
ture. A prediction market setup is well-suited to study the behavioral aspects of
decision making because, in contrast to financial markets (i) the value of shares
in our market is ultimately known and (ii) we can measure the participants’ ex-
post trading performance.
As discussed in Chapter 7 especially inexperienced traders gain from alternative
trading interfaces. Moreover they perform well if they do not need to trade but
rather submit their forecast expectation directly. Hence it seems fruitful to apply
findings from the survey-design domain in designing such interfaces.
Confidence polling - extracting probability distributions from non-experts
People have massive amounts of information about upcoming events, includ-
ing: economic, financial, and political events. However, they are not all partici-
pating in the EIX market due to lack of understanding and market complexities.
Building on findings in the last chapter, the question arises how to build a more
efficient way for users to interact with the market. Most non-experts are famil-
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iar with polling-based interfaces. However, most polling interfaces only allow
participants to submit point estimates. This approach however ignores current
literature on overconfidence and information retrieval.
We could build a new web-interface that might be a more efficient method of
gathering individual-level information than the currently utilized methods. The
web-interface could capture the users’ confidence range at self-selected intervals.
They first set a range for the answer then provide a confidence level for that
range. We then could utilize the mid-point of the confidence range as a point
estimate. Assuming normality we could create a full probability distribution for
each user. The confidence of the users, the inverse of the variance, might pro-
vide us with more meaningful information than just their point-estimate. Figure
Figure 8.1: Polling market interface: Extracting full probability distributions from non-
experts
8.1 displays such a setup. The interface could be designed as a three step (trad-
ing) wizard, with three boxes appearing in order. In the first step, participants
indicate a forecast range to the given economic indicator. The default value is
set to the current market forecast. In the second step they are asked to state the
probability that the outcome is within the specified range. The third box just
displays the generated order. The panels on the right hand side provide the par-
ticipants with additional information, such as the data release date, the current
market forecast and the participant’s portfolio. Based on the results in Chapter
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7, the wizard provides far less information than the default trading interface.
The setup is an extension on the previous chapter on trading interfaces. The
participants’ full distributions can be used to submit orders in an efficient way.
Aggregated confidence-weighted forecasts might be created several ways with
this data. EIX field experiment is a perfect test environment for such this new
interface. Another part of the EIX field experiment is a mobile application.
Mobile market interfaces With the enormous success of the iPhone platform
a rising number of mobile applications is now available. Many of these appli-
cations allow users to make business relevant decisions on the fly. The question
arises if and how decision behavior and decision performance is different in mo-
bile market environments compared to stationary settings. In order to design
mobile systems which support good decision making we need to analyze how
participants search for information and how they incorporate this information
in their decision process. Moreover we need to link behavioral aspects of users
and the quality of their decisions in order to improve the design of mobile in-
terfaces. A part of the EIX-platform is a mobile application for the iPhone. It
seems worth pursuing to run field experiments to answer these questions. From
a market engineering perspective, this research might also yield insights into the
question of how mobile trading interfaces need to be designed. If participants
submit expectations, the market designer needs to develop heuristics to trans-
late the expectations into orders. One feasible way is to use the participants’
expectations as input for automated trading agents.
Figure 8.2: Algorithmic trading and market efficiency
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Combining human and algorithmic agents for making predictions A recent
experimental study by Nagar and Malone (2011) shows that adding automatic
trading agents to a human prediction market might improve forecast perfor-
mance. Measuring both market quality and forecast performance we could di-
rectly test if adding trading agents enhances market efficiency. This could also
potentially enrich the current debate about limiting algorithmic trading in real
financial markets. In general, we would like to compare three different paral-
lel markets (Figure 8.2, left); a human only market, an agent only market and a
mixed market in which both human and algorithmic trader interact. Hence, we
have three comparisons to make. Using the EIX-market as a testbed we can de-
sign a field experiment to make these three comparisons. As depicted in Figure
8.2 (right side); we can compare the EIX to an agent market by running them
in parallel (first period). By allowing agents to access the EIX at a specific time
point we then can compare the EIX human market to an EIX hybrid market us-
ing an event study approach. This also gives us the third comparison between a
hybrid market and an agent only market.
The promising EIX forecast results give rise to the idea to use prediction mar-
kets not only to aggregate information but to directly base decision upon market
prices.
Prediction markets for making decisions To make an informed decision a de-
cision maker must understand the likely consequences of their actions. In or-
der to gain this understanding, in a typical scenario a decision maker consults
a number of experts. To elicit experts’ private information, the decision maker
might run conditional decision markets, i.e. prediction markets with two dis-
tinct features: Firstly, the prediction is not an end in itself but there exists a direct
link from predictions to a decision. Secondly, the market payoff is conditional
on the decision maker’s action. Only if an action is taken the true future state of
the world can be observed the corresponding market is paid out. The other mar-
kets are voided. Experts hold private information, are self interested, and might
have two (partially conflicting) incentives: On the one hand they can capital-
ize on their private information by trading in the decision markets; on the other
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hand they might have preferences over the principal’s action. It seems fruitful to
empirically study these decision markets in online or laboratory experiments.
Combining prediction markets and delphi-systems The track record of pre-
diction markets suggests that markets may help to better foresee future devel-
opments and trends. However, looking at the range of applications, it becomes
clear that there are certain limits. Complex forecasts, such as conditional or qual-
itative judgments are better gathered with traditional forecast methods such as
delphi-systems. However, traditional delphi-systems have some known draw-
backs. First of all, the success of a delphi-study largely depends on the par-
ticipant selection (Ammon, 2009; Gordon, 2007). The most common selection
criteria is reputation which is based on perceived expertise. However, Tetlock
(2005) shows that perceived expertise does not correlate with individual forecast
accuracy. The second drawback is the decreasing participant motivation over
the study’s course. The long, rigid and tedious process leads to decreasing par-
ticipant numbers (Cuhls, 2003).
By combining prediction markets with delphi-studies there might be potential
to reduce these drawbacks.
Figure 8.3: Combining prediction markets and delphi-studies
There are at least two ways delphi-studies can benefit from an accompanying
prediction market; motivation and pre-selection of experts. Prediction markets
motivate participants to contribute continuously through incentives and by pro-
viding constant feedback, both on the aggregate and the individual level.
More participants might be willing to participate (at least partly) in a delphi-
study if they have indicated that they have information regarding a the topic.
The question is how to figure out when a participant has information about a
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topic. This can be detected through the prediction market. If participants change
the market price, they have information about a certain topic and might be will-
ing to fill out some related qualitative and possibly more complex questions (Fig-
ure 8.3, left side). As shown in the third chapter, individual forecast input can
be measured and objectively evaluated in prediction markets. Hence, this might
help to pre-select experts not based on their reputation but on their previous
forecast performance (Figure 8.3, right side).
8.3 Summary
In this chapter we first presented the five main research contributions. The
proposed unified prediction market framework provides the key elements to
systematically analyze prediction market data. Using the EIX market data we
showed the predictive power of prediction markets in the domain of macroeco-
nomic forecasting. In summary, the EIX provided us with an ideal test-bed to (i)
evaluate a novel linear market design, (ii) test the effect of market microstructure
changes on forecast accuracy and (iii) and analyze the interplay between market
interface and trading behavior.
Finally, we outlined seven main challenges for future research on prediction mar-
kets and market interfaces. In particular, we identified the combination of dif-
ferent forecasting systems, the incorporation of personality traits and the design
of market interfaces. While the interface has gained only little attention in mar-
ket engineering literature so far, the results of this thesis indicate that it plays a
significant role in engineering efficient markets. We hope our approach will posi-
tively impact the (prediction) market design community and forecast results will
eventually support economic policy-making in Germany by providing continu-
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